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SUMMARY
Chapter 1: We extend and generalize the existing literature on payment cards
in the presence of merchant internalization by allowing a card platform to price
discriminate across different types of retailers. Despite the platforms ability to
price discriminate, it will set fees for card usage that are too low, resulting in
excessive usage of cards. We show this bias does not disappear even if card fees
(or rewards) can be conditioned on the retailer the cardholder transacts with
and even when merchant internalization is only partial. We thus disentangle the
different contributions of price discrimination and merchant internalization in
explaining biases in the setting of interchange fees.
Chapter 2: Merchant internalization has been proposed as a key reason for
biases in the setting of fees in payment card platforms. This paper extends the
existing payment card literature to generalize the conditions under which mer-
chant internalization arises. Two types of generalization are considered—the
nature of competition between merchants and whether consumer heterogeneity
is ex-ante or ex-post.
Chapter 3: We examine the effect of licensing in a patent competition among
firms competing in a product market. For licensing auction, the licensor stays
in the market when innovation is small and exits the market when innovation
is large. Considering duplicating research efforts as wasterful, it is welfare im-
proving to allow licensing when innovation is large and welfare reducing to
allow licensing when innovation is small. In contrast, for licensing with roy-
alty, the licensor always stays in the market regardless of the magnitude of the
viii
innovation and licensing leads to no change in social welfare.
Chapter 4: In this chapter, we examine technology licensing with royalty in
a Cournot oligopoly market. We consider the contrast of licensing with fixed
fee and licensing with royalty in terms of joint profit and consumer surplus. We




A.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
B.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
B.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
x
List of Tables
3.1 Welfare effect of licensing when the licensor stays. . . . . . . . 66
3.2 Welfare effect of licensing when the licensor exits. . . . . . . . 67
D.1 Numerical Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
D.2 Numerical Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
D.3 Numerical Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
D.4 Numerical Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
D.5 Numerical Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
D.6 Numerical Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
D.7 Numerical Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
D.8 Numerical Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
xi
Chapter 1




Card platforms such as those offered by Visa andMasterCard have been attacked
by policymakers and large retailers for setting excessive interchange fees. These
fees, which the platforms use to redistribute revenues from the retailer side of
their networks (from acquirers) to the cardholder side (to issuers), have been
subject to litigation or regulation in over 30 countries. Proponents of these ac-
tions charge that excessive interchange fees drive up fees to retailers and so retail
prices, while funding excessive rewards and other benefits for using cards, that
result in excessive card use.
An existing literature (including Bedre-Defolie and Calvano, 2013, Guthrie
and Wright, 2007, Reisinger and Zenger, 2014, Rochet and Tirole, 2002, 2011,
Schmalensee, 2002, Wang, 2010 and Wright, 2004, 2012) has tried to address
whether a privately set interchange fee exceeds the socially optimal level. This
1This chapter is a joint paper with Professor JulianWright, National University of Singapore.
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literature has assumed price coherence, that consumers will pay the same retail
price whether they pay with cards or cash. Recent works (since Wright, 2004)
have also allowed for the heterogeneity of retailers (i.e. sellers), with differ-
ent sellers obtaining different benefits of accepting cards. The two most recent
papers in this line of research (Bedre-Defolie and Calvano, 2013, and Wright,
2012) have both been able to establish that a systematic upward bias in inter-
change fee arises. However, none of the models developed to date has explicitly
allowed the platform to set different interchange fees to different sellers.
In practice, card platforms do set different interchange fees for different
types of sellers. MasterCard, for instance, had 36 different interchange fee
categories in 2014 for consumer credit cards transactions in the U.S. reflect-
ing different types of sellers such as Airlines, Insurance, Lodging and Auto-
rental, Petroleum Base, Public Sector, Real-Estate, Restaurants, Supermarkets,
and Utilities.2 In general, we expect a monopolist that can perfectly price dis-
criminate will extract all user surplus and thereby make other choices, like set-
ting interchange fees, efficiently. Thus, it is interesting to ask whether the ability
of the platform to price discriminate restores the efficient fee structure in this in-
dustry? In this paper we will allow for such price discrimination and show how
it affects the bias towards excessive interchange fees (and so merchant fees).
Wright (2012) establishes a systematic bias towards excessive interchange
fees by allowing for merchant internalization. Merchant internalization is the
property that, given price coherence, sellers will take into account the surplus
that buyers get from using cards when determining the fee they are willing to pay
2See MasterCard Worldwide, U.S. and Interregional Interchange Rates.
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the card platform to accept cards since accepting cards allows them to raise their
common retail price or attract more customers at the same price. This results in
sellers’ willingness to pay to accept cards to overstate the social surplus created
for sellers and the card platform therefore sets its single interchange fee too high.
Wright obtains this result despite assuming no price discrimination possibilities
on either side.
Bedre-Defolie and Calvano (2013) establish a similar systematic bias to-
wards excessive interchange fees by making instead the realistic assumption
that consumers make two decisions: (i) whether to hold a card from the card
platform and (ii) whether to use the platform’s card. In line with these two deci-
sions, they assume a card issuer can set a two-part tariff which leads the issuer
to extract more surplus from cardholders. However, they also assume that the
platform cannot set different interchange fees for different types of sellers, so
that the surplus of inframarginal sellers is not similarly extracted. This asymme-
try in discrimination possibilities again causes the card platform to set the single
interchange fee too high. They obtain this result while shutting down merchant
internalization by assuming monopolistic sellers that face unit demands.
In this paper we combine aspects of these two papers to provide a single uni-
fied model that allows us to understand the different roles played by merchant
internalization and price discrimination in determining any systematic bias to-
wards excessive interchange fees. In the setting closest to Bedre-Defolie and
Calvano (2013) we assume buyers make two decisions, an issuer sets a two-part
tariff, the platform can only set a single interchange fee, and merchant inter-
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nalization does not hold. In this setting we also find a bias towards excessive
interchange fees. Thus, we replicate Bedre-Defolie and Calvano’s finding in our
slightly different framework. Adding merchant internalization reinforces this
bias. Allowing the platform to set different interchange fees for each different
type of seller reduces the upward bias in interchange fees. Indeed, without any
merchant internalization, the bias found by Bedre-Defolie and Calvano vanishes
in case the platform can fully price discriminate. Thus, full price discrimination
on both sides eliminates the bias towards excessive interchange fees, but only in
the absence of any merchant internalization. On the other hand, with any posi-
tive degree of merchant internalization, the bias towards excessive interchange
fees remains. Specifically, we show that with some degree of merchant inter-
nalization, a card platform will always set the weighted average interchange
fee too high compared to the socially optimal level of interchange fees. More-
over, with full merchant internalization and price discrimination we establish a
new result—that surplus reducing transactions exactly offset surplus enhancing
transactions, and the card platform contributes nothing to overall welfare de-
spite being profitable. This implies consumer surplus is actually reduced by the
existence of the card platform in our setting, reflecting that the platform raises
retail prices.
To understand why (partial) merchant internalization results in the card plat-
form setting excessive interchange fees, note that under seller-side price dis-
crimination, interchange fees are set to extract the inframarginal sellers’ surplus
from accepting cards. From merchant internalization, each such seller (par-
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tially) takes into account the average surplus its customers expect to get from
using cards. Provided buyers face the same price for goods regardless of how
they pay, this surplus also determines what buyers are willing to pay to hold the
card in the first place. Thus, the buyers’ surplus from card usage gets counted
more than once—once when the platform extracts surplus from the consumers
who hold cards, and again (at least partially) when the platform extracts surplus
from each seller that accepts cards. The resulting fee structure favors cardhold-
ers and is biased against sellers.
The bias we find is similar to that given by Proposition 5 of Wright (2012)
in which price discrimination is discussed. However, Wright (2012) does not
consider the case with multiple interchange fees, instead focusing on a platform
that sets a single interchange fee and a monopoly acquirer that can price dis-
criminate across sellers. The particular pricing and biases that result from that
setup differ from the case with multiple interchange fees. This is because the
surplus captured from infra-marginal sellers by a monopoly acquirer does not
get passed back to the issuer as it would in case interchange fees are used to
extract the surplus from such sellers. Thus, card fees are determined differently
and the results in Wright (2012) cannot be used to determine what happens with
multiple interchange fees. Thus, we believe ours is the first paper to analyze the
welfare implications of privately set multiple interchange fees explicitly. We
also go further than previous papers by considering what happens for the full
range of merchant internalization.
As well as considering the case in which different interchange fees are pos-
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sible for each different type of seller, we also consider what happens under
perfect price discrimination on both sides. Perfect price discrimination requires
that card usage fees (or rewards) can be conditioned on the particular seller the
cardholder transacts with. In recent years, issuers have increasingly offered re-
wards that are specific to certain retail segments (e.g. for gas, groceries, or
restaurants) suggesting such conditioning of fees or rewards is increasingly fea-
sible. With perfect price discrimination, a central planner can achieve the first
best outcome by ensuring each buyers’ usage fee (or reward) reflects the joint
costs of issuing and acquiring net of the particular seller’s convenience benefit
of accepting cards. This setting gives a particularly sharp result. All sellers for
which some efficient transactions are possible accept cards, and this is true re-
gardless of whether the platform or the planner sets interchange fees. However,
for all such sellers (other than the marginal seller that just accepts cards), the
platform will set interchange fees that are too high. As a result, buyers will face
usage fees that are too low and cards will be used excessively when interchange
fees are chosen by the platform. In other words, in this setting, interchange fees
are excessive for each type of seller accepting cards.
In addition to expanding the scope of settings in which a bias towards exces-
sive interchange fees arises, we also provide some new results on the implica-
tions of platforms being able to set different interchange fees for each different
type of seller. Policymakers have taken different positions on this in regulatory
settings. E.g. in Australia, policymakers have allowed platforms to set different
credit card interchange fees subject to a cap on the average interchange fee. In
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contrast, in the U.S., policymakers have required debit card interchange fees in
all categories to be subject to the same cap, thereby effectively ruling out dis-
criminatory interchange fees.3 Not surprisingly, we find that welfare is higher
when the planner is able to set different interchange fees compared to a planner
that can only set a single interchange fee, suggesting that in regulated contexts,
different interchange fees can be beneficial. However, we find that in the un-
regulated case, welfare decreases (increases) if a platform is able to set different
interchange fees and the degree of merchant internalization is high (low), sug-
gesting price discrimination can be harmful in the absence of any regulation.
The rest of our article proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our
model. Results under perfect price discrimination, with almost perfect price
discrimination, and with only a single interchange fees are presented in Sections
3, 4 and 5 respectively. Section 6 compares results across the three settings,
while Section 7 provides some concluding remarks.
1.2 Model
We assume there is a single four-party card platform. Following Bedre-Defolie
and Calvano (2013), this involves a monopoly issuer that signs up cardhold-
ers, and identical and competitive price setting acquirers that sign up sellers.
This follows the approach in Rochet and Tirole (2002) and many subsequent
works that there is limited competition between issuers but intense competition
between acquirers. Obviously, the assumption of a single issuer and multiple
3Wang (2014) shows how such a regulation can lead to additional unintended negative con-
sequences in the presence of demand externalities.
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identical acquirers is an extreme form of the asymmetry between issuers and
acquirers, but it turns out to significantly simplify our analysis allowing us to
generalize the model in other ways. As we will show, this asymmetry in the
nature of competition does not create any bias in the setting of interchange fees
given we will allow the issuer to set an optimal tariff to buyers so that the pass-
through of interchange fees on each side will be perfect.
This setup means the only profit obtained by the platform will be that ob-
tained by the issuer. We therefore assume, as is standard in the existing litera-
ture (see Bedre-Defolie and Calvano, 2013, Rochet and Tirole, 2002, 2011, and
Wright 2012), that the platform chooses its interchange fees to maximize the
profit of its members, in this case the single issuer.
The issuer incurs a cost cB per card transaction and the acquirer a cost cS per
transaction. We define c = cB+ cS as the total cost per card transaction. When
a buyer purchases from a seller using the payment card, the buyer and seller
obtain convenience benefits bB and bS respectively. These are the convenience
benefits as measured relative to some alternative (say cash). Suppose there is a
continuum of different retail sectors each corresponding to a particular draw of
bS. Each sector involves two or more symmetric and differentiated sellers that
compete for buyers. We adopt the general Perloff and Salop (1985) model of
competition, allowing for n   2 symmetric sellers to compete in each sector.4
Buyers are assumed to be matched with each different sector and to buy one
unit of the good from each sector (i.e. from one seller). Thus, the total number
of goods sold is fixed. Interchange fees are assumed to be the same for the
4In Appendix A, we detail the model and show how all our assumptions hold in this model.
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symmetric sellers within any given sector. We require that in equilibrium the
symmetric sellers all set the same common price, which will be a feature of the
Perloff-Salop model. Moreover, we assume this price leaves sufficient surplus
for buyers that even when the card platform sets interchange fees optimally,
buyers will always want to purchase one unit of the good in each sector. We
give a sufficient condition for this in the Perloff-Salop model given in Appendix
A.5 Moreover, we assume price coherence holds, so the price set by each seller
is the same regardless of how consumers pay (possibly since this requirement is
imposed by the platform, the so-called no-surcharge rule).
Buyers first have to decide whether to hold the payment card given they
may face a fixed fee for doing so. We assume buyers realize their particular
draw of bB only at the point of sale. This timing assumption is the standard now
adopted in the literature (see Bedre-Defolie and Calvano, 2013, Guthrie and
Wright, 2007, Rochet and Tirole, 2011 and Wright, 2004, 2012).6 The buyers’
distribution of convenience benefits is assumed to be independent of the sector
they buy in.
We use a to denote the interchange fee set by the platform, a fee paid from
the acquirer and received by the issuer for each unit sold using the payment card.
5Another model of seller competition in each sector that meets all the requirements we need
is the Hotelling-Lerner-Salop model with sellers equal distance apart, buyers’ locations uni-
formly distributed, and linear or quadratic transport costs. See Rochet and Tirole (2011).
6This assumption implies buyers are ex-ante homogenous so that a monopoly issuer that
can set a two-part tariff will be able to fully extract the surplus of cardholders. We can allow
some fraction of buyers to draw bB before they decide whether to hold a card, some to draw
bB after they decide whether to hold a card but before they decide which seller to go to, and
the remainder to draw bB only at the point of sale. Provided the platform can continue to fully
extract buyer surplus from card usage by setting different fixed fees to buyers that differ, and
provided buyers all continue to purchase one unit in each seller sector, then the results in the
paper continue to hold. Section B.5 in the Supplementary Appendix analyzes this case, available
at http://profile.nus.edu.sg/fass/ecsjkdw.
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In general we will allow a to vary with the seller’s type, that is, assuming the
platform can identify and directly price discriminate across the different seller
sectors. Since acquirers are identical and perfectly competitive, their fees pS
charged to sellers of type bS just recover unit costs cS and the interchange fee
they have to pay for the seller bS.
The monopoly issuer faces buyers that are ex-ante identical. Aside from the
fee pB (or reward, if pB < 0) for card usage, the issuer will want to set a fixed
participation fee fB to extract buyers’ expected surplus from using cards. We
will initially consider the ideal case that the issuer can condition pB on the type
of seller the cardholder is buying from. This would correspond to a cardholder
being offered rewards that could differ across different retail sectors. In practice
this type of contingent pricing is not common, and the previous literature has
not allowed for. Therefore, we will also consider the case in which pB cannot
be contingent on the sellers’ type.
We adopt the following timing assumptions.
• Stage 1: Interchange fees are set (either by a planner or the platform).
• Stage 2: A monopoly issuer sets its per transaction fee(s) and fixed fee for
buyers, and competing acquirers set their merchant fees.
• Stage 3: Without observing the fees faced by the other side, buyers decide
whether to hold cards and sellers decide whether to accept cards. Sellers
set their prices.
• Stage 4: Buyers observe which sellers accept cards and their prices and
10
choose a seller to buy from.
• Stage 5: At the point of checkout at the chosen seller, buyers draw their
convenience benefit of using cards and decide whether to use the card
(assuming they hold the card and the seller accepts payment by card),
purchase with cash, or not purchase at all.
The timing is standard except that in stage 3 we assume that each type of
user (i.e. buyers and sellers) cannot observe the fees charged to the other side.7
This is done purely to simplify the analysis. Our approach means that the issuer
takes the number of sellers as given when setting its fees to cardholders. The
implication is that the issuer sets the buyer per-transaction fee pB efficiently for
any given interchange fee such that all its profit is obtained through the fixed fee
it charges. If instead sellers could observe card fees, the issuer would want to
set an even lower card fee so as to induce more sellers to accept cards so it can
charge a higher fixed fee, but this would unnecessarily complicate the analysis.
We make some standard definitions and technical assumptions, which hold
for i 2 {B,S}. We assume that the distribution for bi is a smooth function Hi





quasi-demand Di (xi) = 1 Hi (xi). Define bi (xi) = E (bi|bi   xi) as the aver-
age convenience benefit per transaction for i, vi (xi) = bi (xi)  xi as an average
surplus measure per transaction for i, and Vi (xi) = vi (xi)Di (xi) as an expected
surplus measure for i. Note we have V 0i = Di. Also note b 0i (xi)> 0 for xi < b¯i
7We assume users expect the fees charged to other side to be equal to their equilibrium levels;
i.e. they hold passive beliefs. See Hagiu and Halaburda (2014) for a more general analysis of
two-sided platforms in which users cannot observe fees charged to the other side, and the use of
passive beliefs in this context.
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given our full support assumption, so bB (pB) = E (bB|bB   pB) is an increasing








is an increasing function of bˆS, and









We assume strict log-concavity of Di, which is equivalent to assuming the haz-
ard rate of Hi is strictly increasing. From this we have that v0i < 0 (e.g. see
Bedre-Defolie and Calvano, 2013), and so 0< b 0i < 1.
We assume it is possible for some card transactions to be efficient, so we
assume bB+bS > c. We also make two further technical assumptions:
E (bB)+bS  c< 0 (1.1)
E (bS)+bB  c< 0. (1.2)
The first assumption says that buyers sometimes get a very low (possibly neg-
ative) convenience benefit from using cards which would mean that requiring
buyers always use cards would be inefficient, even at the seller that gets the
maximum benefit from accepting cards. The second assumption says that sell-
ers sometimes get a very low (possibly negative) convenience benefit from ac-
cepting cards which would mean that requiring all sellers accept cards would be
inefficient, even for the buyer that gets the maximum benefit from using cards.
These assumptions provide sufficient conditions to rule out that the privately op-
timal solution involves corner solutions whereby either buyers always use cards
or sellers always accept them.
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Facing a single price regardless of whether they use cards or cash for pay-
ment, buyers will want to use cards if and only if bB   pB. We assume partial
merchant internalization holds—that sellers with convenience benefits bS will
accept cards if and only if
pS  bS+avB (pB) , (1.3)
where 0  a  1 and pB and pS are the relevant fees that apply for card trans-
actions between buyers and these particular sellers. Rochet and Tirole (2011)
and Wright (2012) adopt this assumption but require a = 1. We relax their as-
sumption by only requiring partial merchant internalization. We also consider
the case with no merchant internalization (i.e. a = 0).
Merchant internalization means a buyer’s expected surplus per card transac-
tion is partially or fully taken into account by a seller in its decision of whether
to accept cards. This can arise if by accepting cards, sellers are able to capture
some of the buyers’ expected user surplus from using cards through a higher
price (or higher market share at the same price). Rochet and Tirole (2011) show
that (1.3) holds when sellers compete in Hotelling-Lerner-Salop differentiated
products competition and buyers only learn sellers’ card acceptance policies
with probability a . In Appendix A we show that (1.3) holds for the general
Perloff-Salop model of competition with two or more competing sellers. In
case a = 1, Wright (2010) shows the assumption holds with Cournot compe-
tition and elastic goods demand, Wright (2012) shows it holds for a model of
a monopoly seller, and Ding (2014) shows it holds in quite a general class of
imperfect competition models.
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With this model, we will consider three different degrees of price discrimi-
nation. We start with the idealized case in which the platform can set a different
interchange fee for each different seller type (i.e. bS) and the issuer can also
condition its fee to buyers based on each different seller type. This would al-
low a planner that had access to the same information as the platform to set
these fees to achieve the first-best solution, so card transactions would arise if
and only if bB+bS > c holds. We call this case “perfect price discrimination”,
which is considered in Section 1.3. Subsequently, we will consider in Section
1.4 the more realistic case in which the issuer cannot set fees and rewards that
depend on the type of sellers that cardholders purchase from, and in Section 1.5,
the case in which the platform can only set a single interchange fee.
1.3 Perfect price discrimination
Suppose that the platform and issuer have full information and are unconstrained
in the fees that they can set. The platform will want to set different interchange
fees for each different type of seller (i.e. for each different retail sector). The
issuer will want to reflect these in the fees and rewards it sets to its cardholders.
In particular, the issuer will want to set its level of pB conditional on the sec-
tor the buyer is purchasing in. This possibility is increasingly feasible as some
card issuers in the U.S. do offer higher rewards for transactions in specific retail
sectors (typically, gas, groceries and restaurants). Some U.S. issuers offer spe-
cial rewards at specific retailers, a practice that is also common in Asia. Such
a possibility is likely to become even more prevalent in the future, as fees and
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rewards may be displayed in real time on the payment device itself.8
Allowing for perfect price discrimination provides a useful benchmark. One
might expect that the ability of the monopoly platform (and issuer) to set dif-
ferent price signals to both buyers and sellers for each different type of seller
that buyers purchase from would give rise to an efficient outcome. Indeed, we
will show that without any merchant internalization, the platform will achieve
the first-best outcome. A planner will do the same for any degree of merchant
internalization. In contrast, we will show a profit-maximizing platform will set
excessive interchange fees whenever there is a positive degree of merchant in-
ternalization.
Since there are a continuum of seller types, we will allow for a continuum of
interchange fees, denoted a(bS), and a continuum of card fees, denoted pB(bS).
Given the platform (through the issuer) can always extract more from sellers
with higher convenience value of accepting cards, it will be optimal for the plat-
form to have some critical level of bS such that all sellers with bS above some
critical level participate and all those with a lower level of bS do not participate.
Denote the critical level bˆS. It will be optimal to extract all possible surplus from
those sellers accepting, since this allows the monopoly issuer to offer more sur-
plus to cardholders, which it can extract through its fixed fee. Bertrand competi-
tion between identical acquirers will result in sellers with convenience benefit bS
facing equilibrium merchant fees p⇤S (bS) = cS+ a(bS). Given merchant inter-
8In reality, card platforms also offer multiple types of cards (e.g. platinum vs. regular) with
different interchange fees that are designed for different types of buyers. Issuers also reflect
these different interchange fees in the fees and rewards offered. These do not arise in our set-
ting given buyers are assumed ex-ante identical although see Section B.5 in the Supplementary
Appendix which allows for ex-ante heterogenous buyers.
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nalization, these sellers will accept cards provided p⇤S (bS) bS+avB (pB (bS)).
Thus, the maximum interchange fee that can be set to such sellers so that they
still accept is bS+avB (pB (bS))  cS.










(bB  pB (bS)) dHB (bB)dHS (bS) , (1.4)
where all sellers with bS   bˆS accept cards. Note the first line of (1.4) captures
the profit obtained on each transaction, while the second line of (1.4) captures
the expected surplus of buyers from signing up to the issuer (i.e. it is the fixed
fee charged to buyers). Recall there is no profit on the acquiring side. The issuer
will choose the conditional fee function pB (bS) to maximize its profit in (1.4).
Proposition 1.1. Suppose the platform and planner can set a continuum of in-
terchange fees and the issuer can offer fees that are contingent on the seller’s
type. The first-best outcome can be achieved by the planner imposing the inter-
change fee schedule aW (bS) = bS  cS that applies for transactions at sellers of
type bS. Only sellers with bS   c  bB will accept cards. The platform’s profit
maximizing interchange fee schedule results in the same group of sellers accept-
ing cards. If there is some positive degree of merchant internalization (a > 0),
then interchange fees are everywhere higher, the issuer’s card fee lower and
more buyers use cards when the platform sets interchange fees rather than the
planner. If there is no merchant internalization (a = 0), the outcomes are the
same regardless of whether the platform or planner sets interchange fees.
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Proof. Given the issuer sets a two-part tariff to buyers that are ex-ante identical,
it is optimal for it to set the the usage fee pB (bS) equal to the issuer’s effective
marginal cost for each seller of type bS and use the fixed fee to extract the buyers’
entire expected surplus. Thus, for any a(bS) set by the platform, the issuer
does best with the conditional fee function p⇤B (bS) = cB  a(bS). We establish
this formally in Appendix B by considering a pricing function that differs for
some set of bS values and show it always does worse. Substituting p⇤B (bS) =






(bB  p⇤B (bS)) dHB (bB)dHS (bS) . (1.5)
Since acquiring competition implies p⇤S (bS) = cS+ a(bS) for a seller with
convenience benefit bS, the platform cannot do better than to set a(bS) = a⇤ (bS)
where a⇤ (bS) = bS  cS +avB (p⇤B (bS)) for bS   bˆS and a⇤ (bS) > bS  cS +
avB (p⇤B (bS)) for bS < bˆS. This extracts as much as possible from sellers that
accept cards and makes sure sellers with bS < bˆS do not accept cards. This
implies
p⇤B (bS) = c bS avB (p⇤B (bS)) , (1.6)
for bS   bˆS. In Section B.1.1 of the Supplementary Appendix, we show that
p⇤B (bS)> bB for any bS, so buyers will sometimes not use cards.
Now consider the platform’s choice of bˆS in stage 1. The platform will































= bB and bˆ⇤S = c  bB. Thus, we have bˆ⇤S < bS and bˆ⇤S =
c bB > E (bS)> bS. The uniqueness of bˆ⇤S as a maximizer is easily confirmed
(see Section B.1.2 of the Supplementary Appendix).
Together (1.6) and (1.7) uniquely characterize the global maximum. Finally,
the solution exists given that the issuer’s profit function is continuous and dif-







(bB+bS  c) dHB (bB)dHS (bS) .
Consider the first-best solution in which the planner can set pB (bS) and bˆS di-
rectly, setting bˆS in a first stage, and then pB (bS).
For given bˆS, since it is socially optimal that a transaction takes place when
bS+bB > c and consumers use cards when bB > pB, we have
pWB (bS) = c bS. (1.8)
For sellers with bS < c bB, we have bB < c bS, thus even the buyer with bB
will not use cards at such sellers. Thus, we can write
bˆWS = c bB. (1.9)
The interchange fee schedule aW (bS) = bS  cS delivers the first-best so-
lution. To see this, note we have shown already that given the interchange fee
schedule a(bS), a monopoly issuer will set p⇤B (bS) = cB a(bS) to maximize its
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profit. Substituting aW (bS) into p⇤B (bS) gives (1.8). Since acquirers are compet-
itive, they will set pS (a) = cS+a(bS) = bS. Given (1.3), sellers with bS  c bB
will accept cards, and so we have (1.9).
From (1.6) and (1.8) we know that when 0 < a  1, p⇤B (bS) < pWB (bS) for
every bS > bˆ⇤S. Thus, we have a⇤ (bS) > aW (bS) for bS > bˆ⇤S. When a = 0, the
two interchange fee schedules are identical.
Given the issuer is a monopolist that can set a two-part tariff, it will set its
per-transaction fee efficiently. For each seller-sector defined by bS, the issuer’s
per-transaction card fee (or rebate) will be p⇤B (bS) = cB  a(bS) to reflect its
costs net of the interchange fee for the specific seller its cardholder is trans-
acting with. The issuer then fully extracts buyers’ expected surplus from card
usage through a fixed fee given buyers are assumed to be ex-ante identical. The
platform extracts the maximum that sellers are willing to pay given partial mer-
chant internalization by setting a⇤ (bS) = bS  cS+avB (p⇤B (bS)). This implies
p⇤B (bS) = c bS avB (p⇤B (bS)) for a seller bS that accept cards. Note the first-
best outcome can be achieved if instead pB (bS) = c  bS for every seller. This
would get each buyer to exactly internalize the convenience benefit generated
for each seller. Instead, extracting all of the sellers’ surplus results in buyers
facing a strictly lower card fee for every seller they buy from with cards. This
results in buyers using cards more often at all such sellers.
Perhaps surprisingly the number of sellers at which buyers use cards is the
same in both the private and socially optimal solutions. Note the platform does
not want to attract sellers with such low values of bS that they lower the expected
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surplus of buyers from holding a card (and so how much the monopoly issuer
can extract through its fixed fee). Thus, the marginal seller that accepts cards
will have bS such that vB (p⇤B (bS)) = 0. This implies for the marginal seller that
just accepts cards, buyers are charged a fee of bB so buyers never actually want
to use cards at such a seller. This is also the marginal seller for which any card
transactions take place in the first-best solution. Any seller with lower bS could
not generate a positive surplus even if only the buyer with bB = bB used cards at
the seller.
As established in Proposition 1.1, the platform’s interchange fee schedule
coincides with the planner’s interchange fee schedule when there is no mer-
chant internalization. Moreover, the difference between the two schedules is
everywhere strictly increasing in the degree of merchant internalization. For-
mally, a⇤ (bS) aW (bS) = avB(p⇤B(bS)) is increasing in a .9
One may expect the welfare contributions of the platform to be less when
merchant internalization is stronger, given the greater bias in interchange fees
that arises. We obtain an even stronger result. Under full merchant internal-
ization, a platform that can perfectly price discriminate will contribute exactly
nothing to welfare. The positive surplus generated by efficient card transactions
is offset by other inefficient card transactions, card transactions in which the
buyer’s and seller’s convenience benefit falls short of the cost of the transac-
tion.10 Proposition 1.2 gives the result.
9Note that vB(p⇤B(bS)) is increasing in a since vB(p⇤B(bS)) is decreasing in p⇤B(bS) and p⇤B(bS)
is decreasing in a . The latter follows from totally differentiating (1.6) with respect to a and
p⇤B(bS), and using that  1< v0B < 0.
10This can include transactions where buyers are using cards due to the rewards offered even
though without these rewards they would prefer to use other payment instruments, and transac-
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Proposition 1.2. Suppose the platform and planner can set a continuum of in-
terchange fees and the issuer can offer fees that are contingent on the seller’s
type. With full merchant internalization, the platform contributes negatively to
consumer surplus and nothing to total welfare compared to the situation with-
out the platform. With partial merchant internalization, the platform contributes
positively to welfare although negatively to consumer surplus. In contrast, the
socially optimal interchange fee results in the platform always contributing pos-
itively to total welfare although nothing to consumer surplus.
Proof. We have shown in Proposition 1.1 that under profit maximizing inter-
change fees, the issuer will set p⇤B (bS) = c bS avB (p⇤B (bS)) and so bS c=







(bB  p⇤B (bS) avB (p⇤B (bS))) dHB (bB)dHS (bS) ,
which is positive for any 0  a < 1 and zero when a = 1. Given (1.5), the






vB (p⇤B (bS)) dHB (bB)dHS (bS) .
The contribution to consumer surplus is negative when a > 0 and zero when
a = 0. Note when a = 0, profit maximizing interchange fees coincide with
socially optimal interchange fees. Thus at the socially optimal interchange fees,
the contribution to total welfare is positive and to consumer surplus is zero.
tions where sellers are choosing to accept payment cards due to merchant internalization even
though this raises their handling costs compared to other payment instruments that buyers would
otherwise use.
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Proposition 1.2 demonstrates the potential destruction of surplus that can
arise when card platforms and issuers are left completely free to set discrimina-
tory interchange fees and card fees. It also demonstrates the harm to consumers.
In the Perloff and Salop (1985) model of seller competition that we have adopted
(see Appendix A), sellers fully pass through any fees charged to them by ac-
quirers into their prices. Sellers’ profits in equilibrium do not depend on what
happens to interchange fees. This property means that any change in consumer
surplus is identical to the change in total user surplus from the card platform (i.e.
the change in the aggregation of the individual surpluses bB  pB and bS  pS
across card transactions). Note this accounts for any increase in the sellers’
prices that comes from higher fees charged to sellers by acquirers. Given that
the platform extracts a positive profit, the fact the platform contributes nothing
to welfare when there is full merchant internalization obviously implies it con-
tributes negatively towards consumer surplus. Proposition 1.1 shows consumers
surplus is in fact lowered whenever there is some partial merchant internaliza-
tion.
That buyers are not better off due to the existence of the card platform is not
all that surprising given the assumptions of our setting—that there is a monopoly
issuer and a monopoly platform that are able to fully extract buyer-side surplus.
What is more surprising is that consumer surplus is actually lessened by the
existence of an unregulated card platform.
One may wonder why buyers would use the platform in the first place if
they derive negative utility from doing so? Individual buyers are induced to do
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so due to the benefits of using cards (e.g. due to high rewards) which result
from the high level of interchange fees that are set. These high interchange fees
lead to high merchant fees that are set to sellers, and therefore high retail prices.
At an individual level, buyers have no choice but to pay these high retail prices
(provided they still obtain a positive surplus from buying the goods) if price co-
herence holds. If an individual buyer does not use cards, she would be worse
off—she would still pay the same high retail price but would forgo the benefits
(and possible rewards) from card use. Thus, collectively consumer surplus can
be destroyed even though each individual buyer is better off using cards. Since
in our setting the monopoly issuer always fully extracts buyers’ usage surplus
through a two-part tariff, the existence of the card platform decreases consumer
surplus by increasing retail prices. Since this increase in retail prices is cap-
tured through high seller fees, it follows that the card platform is able to extract
some of the consumer surplus that buyers would otherwise have enjoyed from
purchasing goods in the absence of the card platform. In other words, the exis-
tence of the card platform shifts some surplus that consumers use to obtain from
buying goods to the platform.
1.4 Almost perfect price discrimination
In this section we continue to allow the platform to set a continuum of different
interchange fees for each different type of seller. However, we no longer allow
the issuer to set a different card fee or reward for each different type of seller
the buyer purchases from. In reality, most issuers do not yet condition their fees
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and rewards on the type of seller their cardholders purchase from, although this
may change in the near future. Instead, the issuer sets a two-part tariff to buyers
(a single card fee pB and a fixed fee).
Due to the card fee pB being uniform across different sellers, the first-best
solution is no longer obtainable by a planner. The blending of different card fees
into one also makes the analysis considerably more difficult than the case with
perfect price discrimination. The following lemma characterizes the conditions
on the resulting fee structure that arise from the platform’s optimal interchange
fee schedule. The proof of this and the remaining lemmas and propositions are
collected in Appendix B.
Lemma 1.1. Suppose the platform can set a continuum of interchange fees.
The platform’s profit maximizing interchange fee schedule implies the marginal
seller type bˆS and the issuer’s optimal card fee per card transaction pB are





bˆ⇤S = c bB (p⇤B) avB (p⇤B) . (1.11)
We now turn to characterizing the socially optimal interchange fee, which is
uniquely characterized in the next lemma.
Lemma 1.2. Suppose the planner can set a continuum of interchange fees. The
planner’s welfare maximizing interchange fee schedule is aW = bS cS for bS  
bˆWS and a
W > bS  cS+avB (pB) for bS < bˆWS , where the marginal seller type
bˆS and the issuer’s optimal card fee per card transaction pB are defined by the
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The weighted average interchange fee aW = bS
 
bˆWS
  cS implied in Lemma
3.3 is equivalent to the single interchange fee worked out by Wright (2003),
which generalizes the Baxter (1983) interchange fee to the case that sellers are
heterogenous. Wright assumed the platform can only set a single interchange
fee and that issuers were perfectly competitive. Here we allow for the possibility
of different interchange fees for each different type of seller and assume there
is a monopoly issuer that can set a two-part tariff to cardholders. Despite these
differences, the same weighted average interchange fee is chosen by the planner.
Having characterized the platform’s optimal interchange fee schedule and
the interchange fee that maximizes welfare, we are now in a position to compare
the two.
Proposition 1.3. Suppose the platform and planner can set a continuum of inter-
change fees. If there is some positive degree of merchant internalization (a > 0),
then the weighted average interchange fee is higher, the issuer’s card fee lower,
more buyers use cards and more sellers accept cards when the platform sets in-
terchange fees rather than the planner. If there is no merchant internalization
(a = 0), the market outcomes are the same regardless of whether the platform
or planner sets interchange fees.
The platform over-weights the buyer surplus when working out its optimal
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interchange fee schedule compared to the planner’s decision as a result of (par-
tial) merchant internalization. This leads it to set lower card fees for any given
value of bˆS. Compared to the analysis of Section 1.3, a complication in the
analysis in this section arises from the fact that the additional profit the platform
extracts from card transactions also leads the platform to allow more sellers to
accept cards, which it does by selecting a lower cutoff value of bˆS, or in other
words, allowing a lower marginal interchange fee. Despite a lower marginal
interchange fee, we are able to use the log-concavity assumptions on quasi-
demand to show that the platform will choose interchange fees that are higher
on average than those chosen by a planner. As a result, card fees will be lower
when interchange fees are set by the platform. Total card transactions will be
higher for two reasons—each buyer is more likely to use the card at a seller that
accepts cards and more sellers accept cards.
Consider a specific example in which bi follows a uniform distribution on⇥
bi,bi
⇤
for i 2 {B,S}, so quasi-demands from each side are linear. Set a = 1
so there is full merchant internalization. Then the weighted average privately
set interchange fee is given by a˜⇤ = bS  cS, with corresponding card fees p⇤B =
c  bS and marginal seller type bˆ⇤S = c  bB. Thus, the weighted average of in-
terchange fees set by the platform is equal to the interchange fee that would be
set by a planner if all sellers had convenience benefits of accepting cards equal
to that of the seller with the highest possible convenience benefit of accepting
cards. In other words, in the privately optimal solution, the buyer uses cards ef-
ficiently only at the seller with the very highest convenience benefit of accepting
26
cards, but uses cards excessively at all other sellers.
For this linear demand example, the socially optimal solution involves buy-
ers using their cards only two-thirds as much as when the platform sets inter-
change fees, and sellers will only accept cards two-thirds as often. Thus, card
transactions would be only four-ninths of the unregulated level of transactions
if the socially optimal solution were adopted. The same is true of the platform’s
profit. In other words, switching to the socially optimal solution would have a
large negative effect on card transactions and the platform’s profit.
While the weighted average interchange fee is higher when interchange fees















/6. This suggests that restricting a platform from
setting multiple different interchange fees (but not regulating the level of the re-
sulting interchange fee) may lead to even higher interchange fees (on average).
We show this is indeed true in the subsequent sections, although we also find
in this linear demand setting that welfare is actually higher with a single inter-
change fee. Further results for this linear demand example are given in Section
6, where we show that the extent of the upward bias caused by the platform
setting interchange fees, measured by the difference between the weighted av-
erage of the interchange fees set by the platform versus the planner, remains
increasing in the degree of merchant internalization.
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Finally, note the results in Proposition 1.2 continue to hold in the present set-
ting. The proof of this claim is almost identical to the proof of Proposition 1.2,




. Thus, the existence of the card platform shifts some
surplus that consumers previously obtained from buying goods to the platform,
and with full merchant internalization, leads to no positive contribution to wel-
fare.
1.5 A single interchange fee
In this section we consider what happens if we have just a single interchange fee
a that can be set. The setting in this section is very close to that in Bedre-Defolie
and Calvano (2013), except we allow for merchant internalization to apply.
From Lemma 4.1, we know that for a single interchange fee a, perfectly
competitive acquirers will set p⇤S (a) = cS + a for all sellers and a monopoly
issuer will set the per transaction fee
p⇤B (a) = cB a (1.14)




to maximize its profit







(pB  cB+a)DB (pB) dHS (bS) .
(1.15)
Substituting (1.14) into (1.15), the platform’s profit can be written as





Now consider the platform’s choice of a in stage 1. Since the platform’s
profit is just the issuer’s profit and since pB is already set to maximize the is-
suer’s profit for a given a, we can ignore the effect of changing a on the issuer’s
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profit through a change in pB. But we cannot ignore the effect of changing a
through bˆS since a change in a will influence bˆS directly which is not accounted
for by the choice of pB given sellers’ acceptance decisions do not depend on the




The first order condition with respect to a can be written as
dp
da











Given (1.14), the solution to (1.17) which we denote as a⇤ can also be written
as the solution to











The characterization of the privately optimal (single) interchange fee is com-
plicated and a direct comparison with the socially optimal (single) interchange
fee is not possible. Instead, to establish the bias in interchange fees, we will
compare each of the solutions to the benchmark interchange fee maximizing
the number of card transactions, showing that the privately optimal interchange
fee is higher than this benchmark while the socially optimal interchange fee is
lower.
Proposition 1.4. Suppose only a single interchange fee can be chosen. For
any degree of merchant internalization (including none), the interchange fee
11Note in Sections 1.3 and 1.4, bˆS is controlled by the platform directly by setting very high
interchange fees for any bS < bˆS so this distinction did not arise in those sections.
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is higher, the issuer’s card fee lower, more buyers use cards but fewer sellers
accept cards when the platform sets the interchange fee rather than the planner.
The bias in the single interchange fee set by the platform is similar to that
established in the existing literature. However, here we are able to relax the re-
quirement of full merchant internalization previously assumed byWright (2012).
Indeed, the bias continues to hold with no merchant internalization, consistent
with the findings of Bedre-Defolie and Calvano (2013). This arises because we
allow the monopoly issuer to optimally set a two-part tariff to buyers that have
to decide both whether to hold the card and whether to use it. This creates an
asymmetry in the ability of the platform to extract surplus from each of the two
sides, with buyers’ surplus being fully extracted but sellers’ surplus not being
able to be fully extracted.
1.6 Comparisons
In this section, we compare various outcomes under the different settings con-
sidered in Sections 1.3-1.5. To get clear comparisons we assume that bi follows




for i2 {B,S}, so quasi-demands from each side
are linear. We evaluate the (weighted average) privately optimal and socially
optimal interchange fees, and the corresponding numbers of sellers accepting
cards, numbers of transactions, consumer surplus and total welfare, comparing
these different metrics across the three different degrees of price discrimination.
Section B.4 in the Supplementary Appendix contains the full solutions for each
of the different metrics. For brevity, here we just show the results for inter-
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change fees, consumer surplus and welfare. We use the subscript ‘p” to denote
the case with perfect price discrimination, the subscript “a” to denote the case
with almost perfect price discrimination, and the subscript“o” to denote the case
with one single interchange fee. The superscript “⇤” refers to the privately op-
timal solution (i.e. the platform chooses interchange fee(s)) and the superscript
“W” refers to the socially optimal solution (i.e. the planner chooses interchange
fee(s)).
Figure 1 shows (weighted average) interchange fees as a function of a for
the different cases.12 Whenever a whole schedule of interchange fees is set for
different sellers, we take the weighted average of these across sellers that accept
cards in order to compare them with the case the platform can only set one
interchange fee. Recall a˜⇤ refers to the weighted average interchange fee that
the platform chooses.


















12The exact level of the curves rely on normalizing some parameters, such as the total surplus
bB+bS cwhich is positive. However, the inequalities between the curves implied by the figure
(including the exact points of intersection) do not depend at all on the particular parameter values
chosen.
31
Figure 1: Interchange fees as a function of merchant internalization
As can be seen from Figure 1, interchange fees are higher when set by the
platform compared to those set by the planner, as implied by Propositions 1.1,
1.3 and 1.4. Thus, we have a˜⇤p > a˜Wp , a˜⇤a > a˜Wa and a⇤o > aWo , with the first two
inequalities becoming equalities when a = 0.
With these results we can therefore address how the degree of price discrim-
ination and the degree of merchant internalization influence interchange fees.
Consider first the case that the platform sets interchange fees. The results show
the platform sets lower average interchange fees when it can price discriminate,
and this is especially so if it can perfectly price discriminate. This is true for any
degree of merchant internalization. Price discrimination allows more sellers to
accept cards, with the additional sellers having low benefits of accepting cards.
These sellers have to be charged lower interchange fees to keep them on board,
which helps to lower the average interchange fee charged.13 At the same time,
a higher degree of merchant internalization always increases interchange fees,
indeed it increases the difference between the platform’s interchange fee and
the planner’s. Thus, the highest average interchange fee arises when there is full
merchant internalization and only a single interchange fee can be set, and this is
also the case in which the difference between the platform’s and the planner’s
choice of interchange fee is the greatest.
Whether average interchange fees turn out to be higher or lower is not a
13The tendency for interchange fees to be lower on average with price discrimination also
turns out to be true if a planner is choosing interchange fees to maximize welfare, but only when
perfect price discrimination is possible. Otherwise, price discrimination raises the planner’s
average interchange fees.
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good measure of the welfare effects of allowing price discrimination. We also
need to factor in changes in the acceptance of cards by different types of sellers,
and the implications for card usage. We thus explore the implications of price
discrimination on welfare directly.
From Propositions 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4, it is clear that the contribution of the
platform to welfare is strictly higher when interchange fees are set by a planner
rather than the platform for each different degree of price discrimination. This
implies WWp >W ⇤p , WWa >W ⇤a and WWo >W ⇤o , with the first two inequalities
becoming equalities when a = 0.
When interchange fees are set by the platform, we know from Proposi-
tion 1.1 that perfect price discrimination leads to the same sellers to accept cards
as in the first-best case. Even sellers with low (possibly negative) convenience
benefit of accepting cards may join. This is efficient because the planner can
set low interchange fees to apply for transactions at these sellers, so buyers face
(relatively) high fees (or low rewards) for using cards at these sellers and buyers
only use cards when they obtain sufficiently high convenience benefits of using
cards. However, with interchange fees set privately, if there is a high degree
of merchant internalization (i.e. a is close to one), then the platform will have
buyers using cards excessively at each type of seller. Thus, buyers use cards
even when they contribute negatively to the joint surplus of the buyers and sell-
ers involved. As a result, perfect price discrimination by the platform leads to
the lowest welfare. Welfare is actually higher when a platform is constrained to
set a single interchange fee, despite the fact that this raises the weighted average
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interchange fee that results. This reflects the fact that only sellers with reason-
ably strong convenience benefits of accepting cards do so when there is a single
interchange fee.14 Figure 2 illustrates.
As Figure 2 shows, the extent to which price discrimination is bad for wel-
fare in the unregulated case depends on the degree of merchant internalization.
With a high degree of merchant internalization, more price discrimination is
harmful. The distortion caused by merchant internalization is amplified by price
discrimination as more sellers are induced to join, and more transactions occur
in which surplus is destroyed. On the other hand, if merchant internalization
is weak, then price discrimination is good since it allows the platform to fully
extract the willingness to pay of all buyers and sellers, which without merchant
internalization would correspond to their true social surplus. The extreme case
of this is the setting in which there is no merchant internalization. Then price
discrimination is good even in the unregulated case, and we obtain the standard
result that perfect price discrimination delivers the first-best outcome.
14In contrast, obviously more price discrimination opportunities is good for welfare when the
planner sets interchange fees. As explained in Proposition 1.1, the first-best outcome can be
achieved when perfect price discrimination is possible.
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Figure 2: Welfare as a function of merchant internalization
Greater merchant internalization amplifies the welfare loss caused by exces-
sive interchange fees when the platform sets multiple interchange fees. Indeed,
when there is full merchant internalization, the welfare created by the platform
under perfect or almost perfect price discrimination will be exactly zero, as we
showed in Proposition 1.2.
Figure 3 shows price discrimination is uniformly bad for consumer surplus,
as it allows the platform to extract more of the surplus from card transactions.
The existence of the monopoly platform can easily lower consumer surplus, so
consumers would be better off without the card platform altogether. Consis-
tent with Proposition 1.2, Figure 3 shows this arises when the platform can set
different interchange fees and there is some positive degree of merchant inter-
nalization. With the platform only able to set a single interchange fee, the effect
of the platform on consumer surplus is ambiguous. Finally, Figure 3 shows the
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extent to which consumers are harmed is once again increasing in the degree of
merchant internalization and in the scope for price discrimination.


















Figure 3: Consumer surplus as a function of merchant internalization
1.7 Conclusion
This paper has shown that a monopoly card platform has a systematic bias to-
wards setting excessive interchange fees that is robust to the extent of merchant
internalization (provided there is some) and robust to the extent of price dis-
crimination by the platform. The previous literature has shown a systematic bias
arises in the case with full merchant internalization but no price discrimination
on either side (Wright, 2012), and the case in which there is price discrimi-
nation on the buyer side by the issuer (by way of a two-part tariff) but no price
discrimination on the seller side and no merchant internalization (Bedre-Defolie
and Calvano, 2013). We adopted aspects of both frameworks and expanded the
range of settings so as to include any degree of merchant internalization up to
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full merchant internalization and a range of price discrimination possibilities.
We show the bias a card platform has towards setting excessive interchange fees
remained robust across the various settings.
In addition to significantly expanding the scope of settings in which a bias
towards excessive interchange fees arises, the paper also provided some new
results on the role of price discrimination and merchant internalization. We
showed that the upward bias in interchange fees and the resulting harm to con-
sumer surplus and welfare is magnified by an increase in the degree of merchant
internalization. We also found that price discrimination tends to reinforce the
bias caused by merchant internalization in that the card platform tends to over-
weight the surplus of buyers from using cards even more when setting inter-
change fees. Interestingly, these results arise despite the fact that the weighted
average interchange fee is generally lower under such price discrimination, re-
flecting that the platform attracts sellers with very low (or negative) convenience
benefits from accepting cards by setting relatively low interchange fees for them.
While we have generalized the settings previously used to establish that pri-
vately set interchange fees are too high, we have still left open the difficult ques-
tion of what happens when overall consumer demand for products is elastic. Ex-
cessive interchange fees drive up retail prices, and these may cause consumers
to sometimes give up purchasing goods thereby opening up another source of
potential welfare loss. However, the possibility consumers may give up pur-
chasing may also limit the extent to which a platform would want to increase
interchange fees in the first place. It therefore remains an open question whether
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allowing for elastic consumer demand would strengthen or weaken the results in
this paper. Another challenging extension is to extend the analysis to allow for
competing platforms. As shown in Guthrie and Wright (2007), this opens up a
range of possibilities, with higher or lower interchange fees possible compared
to the monopoly case. To the extent to which a competitive bottleneck outcome
arises, the results obtained in this paper with a monopoly platform may con-
tinue to hold. Finally, given the important role merchant internalization plays
in driving biases in interchange fees and associated welfare results, it would be
interesting to try to estimate the degree to which merchant internalization holds
in practice. To what extent do merchants actually take into account the benefits






Credit card services are typically offered through payment card platforms, like
Visa and MasterCard, which involves two sides, one side refers to consumers
and the other side refers to merchants. In some articles in the literature, it is
assumed that merchants accept payment cards only when the transactional ben-
efit they get from card transaction exceeds the merchant fee they are charged.
For instance, Baxter (1983), Schmalensee (2002), Wright (2003), Bedre-Defolie
and Calvano (2013) all assume this. However, in other articles in the literature,
it is shown that when merchants set a single price regardless of how consumers
pay, merchants also accept cards for strategic reasons, even if their transactional
benefit of doing so is lower than the merchant fee they face. This has been used
to explain why merchant fees may be set too high.
In Rochet and Tirole (2002), the Hotelling model is considered and it is
shown that under the no-surcharge rule in which merchants set a single retail
price, there is an equilibrium where merchants accept cards whenever the mer-
chant fee they face is less than the sum of their transactional benefit and average
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benefit their customers get from using cards. Rochet and Tirole assume that
cardholders know their benefit of using cards before deciding which store to go
to (i.e. the ex-ante case).
Wright (2004) shows the same result can be established more easily if card-
holders only find out their benefit of using cards at the point of sale (i.e. the
ex-post case). Rochet and Tirole (2011) show the same condition applies in
the Salop circular city model of competition, in which there are more than two
merchants competing. In these models, merchants that accept cards can attract
consumers from the rivals who do not (or equivalently, can raise their retail price
while maintaining a given market share). Merchants take this into account when
deciding howmuch to pay to accept cards. This has been called “merchant inter-
nalization” in the literature. Wright (2012) shows how merchant internalization
leads card platforms to charge merchants too much and cardholders too little.
Some recent literature has explored whether merchant internalization is a ro-
bust feature of market competition between merchants. Wright (2010) considers
a linear demand model of Cournot competition between merchants, which al-
lows aggregate demand to be elastic. He shows that the equilibrium condition
of card acceptance remains the same, and that merchants’ sales and profit are in-
creased as a result of card acceptance. Rochet and Tirole (2011), Wright (2012)
and Ding and Wright (2014) show merchant internalization holds in a variety of
other specific settings, including a competitive setting, a monopoly setting, and
a general Perloff and Salop (1995) competition setting.
In this paper we seek to understand how general the merchant internalization
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condition is. We show for those models that assume a linear demand structure
(i.e. Rochet and Tirole (2002, 2011), Wright (2004, 2010)), the results can
be generalized to allow some fraction of consumers to draw their convenience
benefit of using cards before going to the store and the rest of consumers to draw
their convenience benefit of using cards at the point of sale. Thus, we generalize
previous results in the Hotelling, Salop circular city and Cournot models of
competition that have focused exclusively either on the ex-ante or ex-post cases.
Focusing on the ex-post case, we then show merchant internalization holds
very generally for any price or quantity competition differentiated oligopoly
market setting. Thus, the previous results are just special cases of a much more
general result. This includes a very general discrete choice model and a general
representative-consumer oligopoly model.
These general results help shed light on the reason why merchant internal-
ization holds. Ignoring any convenience benefits merchants might get, which
obviously raise the fee merchants are willing to pay, when merchants accept
cards, their costs per transaction are increased due to the fees they pay. How-
ever, consumers are willing to pay a higher retail price when they can pay by
card since they expect to get various benefits from being able to pay with cards
(which may include financial rewards). If these benefits exceed the fee mer-
chants pay, then consumers willingness to pay will have increased more than
the merchant’s costs. The merchant can raise its price equal to the increased
willingness to pay of consumers, and maintain the same demand. It will there-
fore face a higher profit margin but no change in demand. Whenever this is true
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the merchant will want to accept cards. With the Hotelling and Cournot linear
demand specifications, the benefits across some buyers who want to use cards
and others who do not can be averaged out and compared to costs, so the results
still hold. With non-linear demand specifications, the results hold only with re-
spect to expected benefits, which is why they can only be shown in general in
the ex-post case.
In section 2.2, we introduce the standard payment card platform setup. In
section 2.3 we generalize merchant internalization with respect to whether buyer
heterogeneity arises ex-ante or ex-post, while in section 2.4 we generalize mer-
chant internalization (in the ex-post case) with respect to the class of merchant
competition considered. Finally, section 2.4 briefly concludes.
2.2 Payment Card Platform Model
We adopt the standard setup of a single four-party payment card platform. Con-
sumers or buyers (referred to as B) can use cards to pay. They get a convenience
benefit bB from each card transaction. Merchants or sellers (referred to as S)
can accept cards. They get a convenience benefit bS from each card transaction.
For consumers, the benefit can be interpreted as the additional benefit of using
cards as opposed to using an alternative, e.g. cash. For merchants, the benefit
can be interpreted as the additional benefit (i.e. cost saving) of accepting cards
as opposed to accepting an alternative. Suppose bi is continuously distributed
on the interval [bi, b¯i] according to the density function hi(bi) and distribution
function Hi(bi), i= B,S. Both users get the associated benefits if a card is used
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in a transaction and neither side gets the associated benefit if it is not. bB and
bS are assumed to be drawn independently, and neither side observes the other
side’s particular draw of the interaction benefit. For i = B,S, Di(·) = 1 Hi(·)
is the survival function of user i’s interaction benefit and it is assumed to be
log-concave (or equivalently, the hazard rate of Hi is increasing).
The benefit bS is assumed to be known to merchants before they decide
whether to accept cards or not. There are three scenarios of when bB is drawn.
• 1: bB is drawn before consumers go to the stores; this is called ex-ante
case.
• 2: bB is drawn at the point of sale; this is called ex-post case.
• 3: Some fraction of consumers draw their convenience benefit before go-
ing to the stores and the rest of the consumers draw their convenience
benefit at the point of sale.
The issuer(s) charge(s) pB per transaction for consumers that use cards. The
acquirer(s) set(s) the per transaction fee pS to merchants that accept cards. We
take these as given in analyzing the decision of merchants to accept cards.
Let bˆi, i = B,S denote the interaction benefits of a marginal user on side
i (i.e. users with convenience benefit lower than bˆi won’t use cards to pay or
accept cards). The average interaction benefit is defined as bi(bˆi) = E(bi|bi  
bˆi). The difference between the average and marginal user’s interaction benefit,
which is called i’s inframarginal surplus per interaction, is defined as vi(bˆi) =
E(bi|bi   bˆi)  bˆi. If bˆi = pi, then vi is just the user surplus to i per transaction.
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Then the expected user surplus to a user on side i from using card to pay (or
accepting cards) is Vi(pi) =
R b¯i
pi Di(z)dz, which can equivalently be written as
Vi(pi) = Di(pi)vi(pi).
Suppose for the payments made between consumers and merchants, con-
sumers face the same price from merchants whether they pay by card or other
alternatives, e.g. cash. This could be due to a no-surcharge rule that prevent mer-
chants from adding a surcharge when consumers pay by card. Even in countries
where surcharging is allowed, most merchants keep their prices the same regard-
less of how consumers choose to pay. Thus, facing the same price, consumers
use cards if and only if bB   pB. Whether consumers join the card platform will
be defined in the respective sections later.
In the existing literature, it is shown that merchants accept cards under the
following merchant internalization condition:
bS+ vB (pB)  pS (2.1)
In this paper, we will do some generalizations of the models in the existing
literature and consider whether merchant internalization applies in these exten-
sions.
2.3 Linear models of merchant competition
In this section, we consider the extensions of linear models of merchant compe-
tition such as the Hotelling model, Salop circular city model and Cournot model
by assuming that some fraction of consumers draw their convenience benefit be-
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fore going to the stores and the rest of the consumers draw their benefit at the
point of sale. We also allow for an arbitrary fraction, 0< k < 1 of consumers to
hold cards, with 1 k consumers not holding cards and thus unable to use cards
even if their convenience benefit exceeds the consumer fee, regardless of when
the benefit is drawn.1
2.3.1 Hotelling model
We adopt the setup of Rochet and Tirole (2002), suppose there is a linear city
between 0 and 1, two merchants are located at the two extremes and consumers
are uniformly distributed (with density 1) on this city. Merchants provide con-
sumers with identical goods and compete in prices, they have the same marginal
cost of production, d. The valuation of the good to consumers is v and transpota-
tion cost per unit of distance is t > 0, thus for a consumer located at x, he will
pay transportation fee tx if he buys from the merchant located at 0 and t(1  x)
if he buys from the one located at 1. Also, merchants set the same price whether
consumers pay by cash or card. We consider two timing assumptions
1. Each merchant makes card acceptance choice first and then sets retail
price.
2. For each merchant, card acceptance policy and retail price are set simul-
taneously.
For each timing assumption, we assume that consumers are fully aware of
merchants’ card acceptance policies and observe retail prices before going to
1This can easily be generalized to allow the fraction of buyers that hold cards to be endoge-
nous. However, this article is focused on the merchant internalization condition and not on how
fees are set, so we take the fraction of cardholders as exogenous.
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the stores.
Rochet and Tirole (2002) assume that each merchant makes card acceptance
choice first and then set retail prices, it is shown that when consumers draw
their convenience benefit before going to the stores, merchants accept cards
when bS + bB(pB)   pS. Note that in their paper, they implicitly assume that
pB is a fixed fee and is not taken into account when analyzing merchants’ card
acceptance policies. Thus the card acceptance condition they derive is different
from (2.1), i.e. the card acceptance condition derived in the rest of the literature.
If pB is instead per transaction, it is straight-forward that both merchants accept
cards when (2.1) holds. This was first shown in Wright (2004), in the case that
consumers draw their convenience benefit at the point of sale. We generalize
these findings by assuming that consumers draw their convenience benefit at
different stages of the transactions. We get the following conclusion.
Proposition 2.1. In the Hotelling model, with sufficiently large transportation
cost t, when some fraction of consumers draw their convenience benefit before
going to the stores and the rest of the consumers draw their convenience benefit
at the point of sale,
• If each merchant makes card acceptance choice first and then sets retail
price, we get an equilibrium in which both merchants accept cards if bS+
µvB(pB)  pS, 0 µ  1.
• If for each merchant, card acceptance policy and retail price are set simul-
taneously, we get an equilibrium in which both merchants accept cards if
bS+wvB(pB)  pS, 0 w  1.
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In our setup, even though some fraction of consumers draw their conve-
nience benefit before going to the stores and the rest of the consumers draw
their convenience benefit at the point of sale, for any particular consumer, he
pays by card only when his convenience benefit exceeds the per transaction fee,
so the proportion of cardholders who pay by cards remains the same as that of
the case when all consumers draw their convenience benefit before going to the
stores, which is the case of Rochet and Tirole (2002). Since not all consumers
hold cards in our setup, market shares of merchants are different from those of
Hotelling model in Rochet and Tirole (2002). But regardless of the proportion
of consumers who hold cards, the profit margin of merchants are increased if
they accept cards under merchant internalization.
In Baxter’s early contribution, it is assumed that merchants don’t believe
that accepting cards will help attract consumers, which would be the case if
consumers are not aware of which merchants accept card and they will still buy
the goods even if merchants reject cards. Here we assume that consumers are
perfectly informed of merchants’ card acceptance policies and merchants do
believe that accepting card provides a competitive advantage. Thus, merchants
have lower resistance to cards and they accept cards for the full range of mer-
chant internalization.
2.3.2 Salop circular city model
We consider Salop circular city model which is examined in Rochet and Tirole
(2011) as an extension of Hotelling model. We adopt the setup of Rochet and
Tirole (2011), suppose consumers are located uniformly on a circle of length
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normalized to one. R merchants are located on the circle with equal distance
between any two of them, they provide identical goods to the consumers and
compete in prices, the marginal cost of producing one good is d. Consumers’
valuation of the good provided by merchants is v and transportation cost per
unit of length is t > 0. Each merchant makes card acceptance choice first and
then sets retail price. Consumers are fully aware of merchants’ card acceptance
policies and the retail prices before going to the stores.
In Rochet and Tirole (2011), it is assumed that all consumers draw their
convenience benefit at the point of sale. Just like the generalization of Hotelling
model, we generalize Salop circular city model by assuming that consumers
draw their convenience benefit at different stages of the transactions. We have
the following corollary.
Corollary 2.1. In the Salop circular city model, with sufficiently large trans-
portation cost t, when some fraction of consumers draw their convenience ben-
efit before going to the stores and the rest of the consumers draw their conve-
nience benefit at the point of sale, we get an equilibrium in which all merchants
accept cards if bS+ vB(pB)  pS.
Since Salop circular city model is just a linear extension of Hotelling model
and we have shown that merchant internalization holds in Hotelling model when
we assume that consumers draw their convenience benefit at different stages of
transactions, it is straight forward to extend the result in Salop circular city
model and the intuition is almost the same.
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2.4 General models of merchant competition
In this section, we consider general price and quantity competition in oligopoly
markets, and focus on a general discrete choice model and a general represen-
tative consumer model. We consider the cases in which consumers are assumed
to draw their convenience benefit at the point of sale and all consumers hold
cards. Thus there is no consumer heterogeneity regarding convenience benefit
from using cards at the point consumers choose between merchants.
2.4.1 General discrete choice model
We detail a general discrete choice model of product differentiation and show
how it gives rise to (2.1). There are N merchants and M consumers in the mar-
ket. We assume that the utility consumer i 2 {1,2, ...,M} gets when she buys
from merchant j 2 {1,2, ...,N} is ui, j = ei, j   p j in which ei, j represents the
match value of merchant j’s product for consumer i and p j is the price of mer-
chant j’s product. We assume that ei, j, i 2 {1,2, ...,M}, j 2 {1,2, ...,N} follow
general distributions over some interval which is a subset of R and has lowest
value e . The draws could be correlated among merchants and consumers. A
special case would be where ei, j is drawn i.i.d from a common distribution for
all consumers, in which case the model would correspond to the Perloff and
Salop (1985) model. When the distribution takes the double-exponential form,
this would just be the logit model. Merchant j has a marginal cost c j per unit
sold and its output is denoted as q j, j 2 {1,2, ...,N}.
We assume that consumers buy either one or zero unit of the product and the
49
(indirect) utility of no purchase is normalized to zero. Thus, to ensure consumers
always prefer to buy from one of the merchants, we need e to be sufficiently
high. We have the following conclusion.
Proposition 2.2. In the general discrete choice model, there exists an equilib-
rium in which all merchants accept cards if and only if bS+ vB (pB)  pS.
In the general discrete choice model, merchants’ marginal costs are increased
by pS  bS from accepting cards. Since consumers all draw their convenience
benefit at the point of sale, consumers with convenience benefit higher than
consumer fee will pay by card. Their willingness to pay increases by vB (pB)
when they pay by card. Reflecting this, merchants could pass on the increase
of cost into higher retail prices. Under the merchant internalization condition,
the increase of consumers’ willingness to pay (weakly) exceeds the increase in
the merchants’ marginal costs. Thus merchants’ profit margins are (weakly)
increased by accepting cards and they are willing to accept cards in equilibrium.
2.4.2 Representative consumer model
We consider an oligopoly market with nmerchants. Each merchant ( j= 1,2, ...,n)
has a constant marginal cost c j of production. Merchants compete in quanti-
ties or prices. The indicator variable I j is defined to take the value 1 if mer-
chant j accepts cards, and 0 if not. We assume that outputs are heteroge-
neous in the sense that different merchants produce different products and each
consumer purchases products from all merchants. A representative consumer’
utility function from purchasing goods is u(q1,q2, ...,qn) = f (q1,q2, ...,qn)+
Ânj=1DB (pB)vB (pB) I jq j Ânj=1 p jq j in which q j represents the quantity of the
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good a consumer purchases from merchant j, p j represents the price set by
merchant j, j = 1,2, ...,n and f (q1,q2, ...,qn) is a smooth and strictly concave
function2 of (q1,q2, ...,qn). We have the following conclusion.
Proposition 2.3. In the representative consumer model, there exists an equilib-
rium in which all merchants accept cards if and only if bS+ vB (pB)  pS.
From the utility function, we can derive the demand function and inverse de-
mand function. When merchant internalization holds, accepting cards increases
a merchant’s profit margin if it accepts cards regardless of whether merchants
compete in quantities or prices. The intuition is the same as in the discrete
choice model. What matters is only whether each merchant’s margin is (weakly)
increased when it accepts cards, which happens if and only if merchant inter-
nalization holds. The homogeneous Cournot model analyzed in Wright (2010)
is just a special case of this model.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper focuses on merchants’ card acceptance condition in a payment card
platform model. The analysis is based on the existing work of Rochet and Tirole
(2002, 2011), and Wright (2004, 2010). Extensions of models in these paper are
considered.
Based on Rochet and Tirole (2002, 2011) and Wright (2004, 2010), we gen-
eralize Hotelling model, Salop circular city model and Cournot model in which
all consumers are assumed to draw their convenience benefit before or after they
2From Vives (2001), we know that when utility function of a representative consumer is
smooth and strictly concave, the demand and inverse demand functions derived are downward-
slopping.
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go to the stores by assuming that some fraction of consumers draw their con-
venience benefit before going to the stores and the rest consumers draw their
convenience benefit at the point of sale. It turns out that in this more general
setting, merchants’ card acceptance condition, i.e. merchant internalization, still
holds. For Hotelling model, we also characterize the equilibrium in which both
merchants reject cards, we show that both merchants reject cards under mer-
chant internalization when the proportion internalized by merchants is relatively
higher.
Besides these linear models, we also consider some general models such as
a general discrete choice model and a general representative consumer model,
we focus on the cases in which consumers draw their convenience benefit at the
point of sale and show that all merchants accept cards under merchant internal-
ization.
In the models we discuss, accepting cards increase merchants’ marginal
costs of serving consumers, but they could pass the cost onto consumers by
charging higher retail prices, since consumers have higher willingness to pay
because of the convenience benefit they get from using cards. Under merchant
internalization, merchants’ profit margins increase when they accept cards.
Merchants’ card acceptance condition is of great importance in the study of
payment card platform and interchange fees, since acquiring banks’ fee struc-
ture is based on this condition, platform’s profit structure, social welfare are
defined according to this condition. From our result, we can see that merchant
internalization condition holds in some very general settings.
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Chapter 3
Patent Competition with Licensing
1
3.1 Introduction
Patent licensing of innovation promotes technology diffusion by allowing more
products to be produced efficiently, and increase consumer surplus through low-
ering market price due to a more intense competition. However, the possibil-
ity of licensing also increases the reward of winning a patent, and this may
lead to more duplicating effort in a parallel research compared to no licensing.
As Dasgaupta (1988) puts, “...only the output of the most successful teams en-
gaged in parallel research counts. Subject to the very obvious qualifications, the
achievements of the less successful teams are valueless.” One natural question
is whether allowing licensing under patent competition actually improves social
welfare because welfare effect of licensing can be interpreted as the analysis
of patent protection. As Gallini and Winter (1985) argue, licensing is possible
only if patent protection is available since production techniques are easily kept
1This chapter is a joint paper with Assistant Professor Chiu Yu Ko, National University of
Singapore.
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secret if not licensed.
We consider a patent competition in a parallel research with licensing in
Cournot oligopoly market, focusing on the impact of licensing on social wel-
fare. We consider a three-stage game. In the first stage, firms engage in a patent
competition for a cost-reducing technology modelled by all-pay auction, where
the patent winner is the firm spent the highest effort. In the second stage, the
patent winner may choose to license the innovation to other firms according to
licensing auction or royalty auction.2 In the third stage, firms compete in prod-
uct market non-cooperatively in a quantity competition. We show that under
licensing auction, it is welfare improving to allow licensing when innovation is
large and welfare reducing to allow licensing when innovation is small, whereas
under royalty auction, licensing leads to no change in social welfare.
Moreover, different from models in the licensing literature, we allow the
patent winner to have the option to exit the market.3 The patent winner can
credibly exit the market by selling off the company to other firms. This is a
common way of technology diffusion in information technology industry where
innovations by startup are transferred through acquisitions. It is interesting to
see study whether such an option is welfare improving. To formally model
this, we allow the patent winner to credibly exit the market in the second stage
and potential licensee is aware of the stay-exit decision when bidding for the
license. We show that under licensing auction, licensor exits the market when
2For fixed-fee licensing, it seems difficult to get general results under fixed fee. However, in
Appendix II, we show that it tends to reduce welfare.
3Katz and Shapiro (1985) partially characterize the conditions under which an outsider in-
novator has incentive to enter the market under fixed fee licensing.
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innovation is large and stays in the market when innovation is small, while under
royalty auction, the licensor stays in the market regardless of the magnitude of
innovation. The welfare analysis for royalty auction remains the same but for
licensing auction, allowing the patent winner to exit increases the lower bound
for a welfare-improving innovation. Competition authorities may need to take a
closer look at technology transfers through acquisitions.
Finally, we investigate how industry structure affects the welfare result, fol-
lowing Arrow (1962). The neutral welfare result of licensing under royalty auc-
tion is independent of number of firms in the industry. For licensing auction,
the lower bound for innovations that leads to welfare-improving licensing re-
duces when there are more firms in the industry, and when the industry becomes
competitive, then licensing is always welfare improving for all innovations.
Our paper combines these two strands of literature on innovations: one that
focuses on the pre-innovation environment like patent competition taking the
post-innovation reward as given (e.g., Loury, 1979; Lee and Wilde, 1980) and
the other that determines the optimal post-innovation licensing strategy taking
the innovation as given. Recently, there are two exceptions to study both topics
in a simplified setup. Chang et al. (2013) show that when only one firm can
invest in an innovation, licensing may reduce marginal profits from the innova-
tion, and thus lead to lower welfare. Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2013) show
that, in a duopoly models where firms simultaneously decide whether to invest
a fixed amount in research, licensing never reduce social welfare irrespective of
its effect on innovation.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we intro-
duce the basic setup of our model. Section 3 studies patent competition. Section
4 considers licensing auction and Section 5 studies licensing with royalty. Sec-
tion 6 concludes the paper.
3.2 Model
We consider a complete-information three-stage game where firms producing
homogeneous good engage in competition for a cost-reducing patent, followed
by technology transfer by the patent holder and finally product competition. We
employ the subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) in pure strategies as the solution
concept.
There are K   3 firms in the market with no fixed cost of production. Firms
are indexed as i 2 {1, · · · ,K} and firm k has the marginal cost ck and there are
no fixed costs of production. Thus the profit function for firm k 2 K is pk =
(P ck)qk. Following the literature, we assume that all firms have the same cost
of production so that ck = c < 1 for all k 2 K. With a small abuse of notation,
let the set {1, · · · ,K} be denoted by K as well.
In the first stage, all K firms participate in a patent competition. Following
Dasgupta (1986), patent competition is modelled as a complete-information all-
pay auction (Baye et. al. 1996). Each firmmakes a certain amount of investment
into innovation activity and the firm with the highest investment wins a patent
for a cost-reducing technology that reduces the marginal cost of production from
c to c˜ < c, the other firms lose and their marginal costs remain the same. Baye
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and Hoppe (2003) develop the strategic equivalence of certain class of rent-
seeking (Tullock competition), innovation games and patent race. Although
an all-pay auction does not belong that particular class of rent-seeking games,
our welfare result present the worst scenario should we adopt other types of
competition because an all-pay auction is a special case of general rent-seeking
games where rent is fully-dissipated.
In the second stage, the firm winning the patent competition obtains the
patent. This firm can transfer the technology to other firms by licensing. We
consider two types licensing: licensing auction and royalty auction. For a li-
censing auction, the licensor decides the number of licensees kˇ 2 K and all the
other firms decide independently and simultaneously how much to bid for the
patent. Before the auction, the licensor has an option to credibly exit the market
that the firm will not engage in the third stage competition. Let E and S denote
the case where the licensor exits and stay respectively. Note that for any poten-
tial licensee firm i, the bidding function depends on number of licensees kˇ and
whether licensor will exit E or stay S. Patent is sold to the highest bidders at
their bid prices and in the event of a tie, licensees are chosen arbitrarily. For
royalty licensing, besides choosing number of licensees k, licensor also sets per
output licensing fee, i.e. the royalty ri for firm i to be a licensee. Licensees
choose independently and simultaneously whether to accept the license. At the
end of the second stage, the K 1 inefficient firms are divided into two groups,
a subset G of kˇ licensees and its complement (K 1)/G, the subset of K 1  kˇ
nonlicensees. The members of G can produce with the lower marginal cost c˜
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and those in (K  1)/G produce with their original marginal cost c. Different
from the literature, our winner can also choose not to participate competition in
the product market in the next stage.
In the third stage, firms compete in a Cournot market. The inverse demand
function for this good is given by P= 1 Q where Q=ÂKi=1 qk is the aggregate
production, and qk is production by firm k 2 K. The following lemma presents
the standard result.
Lemma 3.1. The Cournot competition for K firms with the same marginal cost








































for all k 2 {2, ...,K}.
Following the literature, to simplify analysis, we only consider the case such
that all K firms remains in the market without licensing, or P¯> c. This is equiv-
alent to the following condition,
1  c
c  c˜ > 1. (3.1)
This implies our innovation is non-drastic. In our model, patent competition is
between firms competing in the product market. Denote a ⌘ c c˜1 c as the measure
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of magnitude of the innovation. Note that c˜= c a(1  c), and, from (3.1), we
have 0<a < 1. When a! 0, we have c˜! c. When a! 1, we have c˜! 2c 1.
3.3 Patent Competition
Since all firms are symmetric before patent competition, we may denote the
value of winning the patent competition as v. Then the patent competition can
be consider as an all-pay auction with homogeneous valuation v. Baye et. al.
(1996) shows that there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium investments.
Lemma 3.2. (Baye et. al. 1996) In a symmetric all-pay auction with homoge-
nous valuation v, the unique symmetric equilibrium investment of firms is a
mixed strategy [x/v]1/(K 1) for all x 2 [0,v] for all i= 1,2, ...,K.
Therefore, the expected investment of each firm is v/K. Suppose their val-
uation of the patent is v¯ if there is no licensing after patent competition and
vˇ otherwise. Suppose firm 1 is the winner in patent competition. Without li-
censing, we have v¯ = Dp¯1 Dp¯k where p¯1 is firm 1’s profit after patent com-
petition, p¯k is firm k 6= 1’s profit after patent competition, Dp¯1 = p¯1 pk, and
Dp¯k = p¯k  pk. With licensing, we have vˇ = Dpˇ1 Dpˇk where pˇ1 is firm 1’s
profit after licensing, pˇk as a patent loser’s profit after licensing, Dpˇ1 = pˇ1 pk
and Dpˇk = pˇk pk. Therefore, it is useful first to characterize the equilibrium
without licensing. The following Lemma states thye patent winner’s output q¯1,
other firm output q¯k, aggregate output Q¯, market price P¯, patent winner’s profit
p¯1, and other firm’ profit p¯k.
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3.4 Licensing auction
In this section, we consider the case when patent competition is followed by
licensing auction game (Kamien and Tauman 1986). We first study the standard
case that the licensor has no option to exit. Then we characterize the equilibrium
when the licensor has option to exit, and finally, we conduct the welfare analysis.
3.4.1 Licensor without option to exit
We now consider licensing auction when licensor decides to stay in the market.
Licensor’s payoff consists of the profit from production and the revenue from
licensing fee in Stage 2. For any potential licensee, the optimal output depends
on the number of licensees, kˇS and whether it is among the licensees, G. Then
firms’ payoffs are:
pˇS1 = (PˇS  c˜)qˇS1+Â
i2G
bˇSi ,
pˇSi = (PˇS  c˜)qˇSi   bˇSi for all i 2 G,
pˇSj = (PˇS  c)qˇSj for all j /2 G.
where PˇS = 1 ÂKl=1 qˇSl is the market price.
We use backward induction from Stage 3 to Stage 2 to work out the SPE
and the following lemma shows how a leads to different equilibrium outcomes.
The proof is relegated to Appendix I. Through out the paper, we have followed
the literature (for exmaple, Kamien and Tauman 1986) to consider the number
of licensee kˇE,⇤ to be continuous to avoid the integer problem.
Lemma 3.3. Consider the licensing auction subgame when the licensor has no
option to exit in the market. (a) There is no licensing in equilibrium if and only
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3K2 1  a < 2K+1 ;
K 1 if 0< a < 2K3K2 1 .
bˇS,⇤ =
8><>:




3K2 1  a < 2K+1 ;
(2 c c˜+Kc˜ Kc)(c c˜)











3K2 1  a < 2K+1 , i 2 G;
1 c˜
K+1 if 0< a <
2K
3K2 1 , i 2 G.
qˇS,⇤j =
8><>:




3K2 1  a < 2K+1 , j /2 G;
Notapplicable if 0< a < 2K3K2 1 , j /2 G.
PˇS,⇤ =
8><>:




3K2 1  a < 2K+1 ;
1+Kc˜









3K2 1  a < 2K+1 ;
K(1 c˜)









3K2 1  a < 2K+1 ;
(1 c)2+K(c c˜)2 K2(c c˜)(c+c˜ 2) K3(c c˜)2









3K2 1  a < 2K+1 , i 6= 1;
(c+Kc Kc˜ 1)2
(K+1)2 if 0< a <
2K
3K2 1 , i 6= 1.
There is no licensing when innovation is very large (a   1/2). This seems
to be different from La Manna (1993) and Creane, Ko and Konishi (2013) that
licensing always occurs. However, their results rely on the existence of a non-
licensees after technology transfer. In our model, the patent winner prefers to
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enjoy low cost advantages than to compete in a duopoly. When innovation is
large ( 2K+1  a < 12), i.e. cost reduction to licensees is sufficiently large, li-
censor licenses the patent to some inefficient firms and nonlicensees are driven
out of the market, this is because nonlicensees’ production technology is inferior
to other efficient firms and they will get negative profit if they produce. When
innovation is intermediate ( 2K3K2 1  a < 2K+1), some inefficient firms obtain the
license and all firms remain in the market, in this case, although nonlicensees
produce with inferior technology, they still get positive profit through produc-
tion. When innovation is minor (0 < a < 2K3K2 1), it is optimal for licensor to
license to all inefficient firms to maximize the payoff. Knowing that all firms
will be licensees, no inefficient firm will bid bˇ> 0 if there is no restriction. Thus
licensor has to announce that all inefficient firms will be licensees and state a
reservation price slightly below the magnitude bˇ, the benefit to a firm if all are
licensed, below which he will not sell a license. These equilibrium results are
similar to the SPE results in licensing auction in Katz and Shapiro (1986) where
the research breakthrough is accomplished by an outside innovator.
3.4.2 Licensor with option to exit
First consider that the licensor has to exit the market. Licensor’s payoff consists
of the revenue from licensing fee in Stage 2. For an inefficient firm, its optimal
output in Stage 3 depends on the number of licensees, kˇE and whether it is
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pˇEi = (PˇE   c˜)qˇEi   bˇEi , i 2 G,
pˇEj = (PˇE   c)qˇEj , j /2 G.
where PˇE = 1 ÂKl=1 qˇEl is the market price in Stage 3. We use SPE in pure
strategies as we do in the previous section as the solution concept, the only
difference is that licensor does not have to choose its output in Stage 3 as it exits
the market. We use a as a measurement of magnitude of innovation and the
following lemma shows how a leads to different equilibrium outcomes. When
the licensor has to exit the market, the subgame is exactly the same as a licensing
auction game with an outside innovator as in Kaimen (1992). The following
Lemma presents the characterization.
Lemma 3.4. (Kaimen 1992) If the licensor has to exit the market, the licensing
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3K 4  a < 2K , i 6= 1;
(1 c˜ Kc+Kc˜)2
K2 if 0< a <
2
3K 4 , i 6= 1.
With Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4, we can characterize when the innovator decides
to exit the market in Proposition 1.
Lemma 3.5. When patent competition is followed by licensing auction, licensor
stays in the market when innovation is small (0 < a  K2K2 K 2 ) and exits the
market when innovation is large ( K2K2 K 2 < a < 1).
The proof is relegated to Appendix I. When innovation is large, the patent
is valuable to licensees, if licensor exits the market, market price will be higher
and licensees will earn higher profit from production, thus licensor could extract
more from licensees since their bid will be higher. When innovation is small,
the patent is less valuable to licensees and the profit from licensing fee is lower,
thus licensor will engage in production to get production profit.4
4While our licensing auction has delivered a clean result, licensing by fixed fee is not fully
tractable. Kaimen and Tauman (1986) show that an outsider innovator prefers to enter if 2K+1 
a  22K+1 but it is unclear otherwise.
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3.4.3 Welfare implications
Social welfare after patent competition and that after licensing are respectively
written as:
W¯ = p¯1+(K 1)p¯k+ (Q¯)
2
2




where the first two terms are from producer surplus and the last term is consumer
surplus. Denote W as the social welfare before patent competition. Suppose
firm 1 be the winner in patent competition. Since investment expense reduces
firm’s total profit, we need to subtract expected total investment I¯ = K(Dp¯1 
Dp¯k) = K(p¯1 p1  p¯k+pk) where k 6= 1 from the social welfare after patent
competition. Therefore, the expected net increase of social welfare could be
written as




If patent competition if followed by licensing, take total investment of patent
competition, Iˇ = K(Dpˇ1 Dpˇk) = K(pˇ1  p1  pˇk + pk) into account, the net
increase of social welfare after licensing could be written as




in which i= 1,2, ...,K. Therefore, the change of social welfare due to licensing
is
DW = DWˇ  DW¯ = K[pˇk  p¯k]+ 12 [(Qˇ)
2  (Q¯)2]
where the first two terms are change in non-licensors’ profits due to licensing,
and the last two terms are change in consumer surplus due to licensing. Then
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we can check whether licensing after patent competition is welfare improving
when licensor exits and stays. The results when the licensor has no option to
exit are summed up in the following tables 5.
Licensor Conditions Non-Licensee Welfare Improving?
Stay 0< a  2K3K2 1 No(All licensed) No
Stay 2K3K2 1 < a <
2
K+1 Stay No when
2K
3K2 1 < a  2KK2+6K+3
Yes when 2KK2+6K+3 < a <
2
K+1
Stay 2K+1  a < 1 Exit Yes
Table 3.1: Welfare effect of licensing when the licensor stays.
When innovation is of larger magnitude, the increase of consumer surplus
due to licensing 12 [(Qˇ)
2  (Q¯)2] is first increasing as long as no firm exit due
to a deeper technology diffusion, and then decreasing once nonlicensees as the
difference of technology diffusion is closing. The same logic applies to ex-
plain why the decrease of profits by non-licensors due to licensing K[pˇk  p¯k]
first increases and then decreases. The effect from drop in profit dominates for
small innovations but the effect from increase of consumer surplus dominates
for larger innovations.
Proposition 3.1. For licensing auction, if licensor is not allowed to exit the
market, licensing is welfare improving when innovation is large ( 2KK2+6K+3 <
a < 1) and welfare reducing when innovation is small (0< a  2KK2+6K+3 )
Now consider the case when the licenser is committed exit. The result is
similar except when innovation is very small. The change of non-licensor’s
5In Table 1, the first column refers to the case in which licensor stays in the market after
licensing. In Table 2, the first column refers to the case in which licensor exits the market after
licensing. For the third column, “Exit”, “No”, and “Stay” denotes the cases where non-licensees
exit the market, licensor licenses to all firms, and non-licensees stay in the market, respectively.
66
Licensor Conditions Non-Licensee Welfare Improving?
Exit 0< a  23K 4 No(All licensed) Yes when 0< a < 1K2 K 1 ,
No when 1K2 K 1 < a <
2
3K 4 .
Exit 23K 4 < a <
2
K Stay No when
2





2K3+11K2+5K < a <
2
K
Exit 2K  a < 1 Exit Yes
Table 3.2: Welfare effect of licensing when the licensor exits.
profit due to licensing with exit is positive because the effect of the licensor’s
exit dominates the effect of a deeper technology diffusion. As shown in Propo-
sition 3.5, the licensor prefers to staying in the market when innovation is small.
Therefore, the welfare result is similar as in shown the in the following Propo-
sition.
Proposition 3.2. For licensing auction, if the licensor is allowed to exit the
market, licensing is welfare improving when innovation is large ( 4K
2+2K+2
2K3+11K2+5K <
a < 1) and welfare reducing when innovation is small (0< a  4K2+2K+22K3+11K2+5K ).
Comparing the sets of innovations for a welfare-improving licensing be-
tween the case where the licensor has an option to exit or not, it turns out that
with the option to exit, the upper bound for a welfare-improving licensing re-
duces, which implies such a option may be welfare reducing. This leads to an
important implication for property protection policy. Government should pro-
tect substantial innovation but not minor innovation.
Proposition 3.3. If the licensor has an option to exit, there is a set of innova-
tions ( 4K
2+2K+2
2K3+11K2+5K  a  2KK2+6K+3 ) such that licensing changes from welfare
improving to welfare reducing.
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Since many models the literature does not allow the licensor to exit the mar-
ket, some welfare-improving implication may need to be further qualified.
Before concluding this section, we investigate how the industry structure
may affect the welfare result. It is easy to show that both lower bounds 4K
2+2K+2
2K3+11K2+5K
and 2KK2+6K+3 are decreasing with K. More over both bounds approach zero as
K approaches infinitely. Hence, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4. The increase in number of firms K in the market will enlarge
the set of innovation such that licensing is welfare improving. If the industry
is perfectly competitive, i.e., when K ! •, then licensing is welfare improving
regardless of magnitude of innovation.
Consider a patent competition with firms engaging in the perfect competi-
tion. There is no licensing under assumption in (3.1). Hence, allowing licens-
ing does not change the welfare. This seems to contradict Proposition 3.4 that
there is always licensing and it is welfare improving. The key differences are
that under oligopoly, the change in consumer surplus is always positive due to
technology diffusion, and the change in producer surplus approaches zero when
there are more and more firms.
3.5 Licensing with Royalty Auction
In this section, we consider the case when patent competition is followed by a
royalty auction game. Similar to the case of licensing auction, we first analyse
the standard case where the the licensor has no option to exit, then characterize
the equilibrium when the licensor has an option to exit, and finally conduct the
68
welfare analysis.
3.5.1 Licensor without option to exit
We now consider licensing with royalty auction when licensor has no option to
exit the market. In the licensing stage, the licensor will set the royalty as rˇS.
Given the number of licensees, kˇS, firms’ payoffs are:
pˇS1 = (PˇS  c˜)qˇS1+ kˇSrˇSqˇSi , j 2 G,
pˇSi = (PˇS  c˜)qˇSi   rˇSqˇSi , i 2 G,and
pˇSj = (PˇS  c)qˇSj , j /2 G
where PˇS = 1 ÂKl=1 qˇSl is the market price. We solve the game by backward
induction. In Stage 3, for given kˇS and rˇS, from first order condition of profit
maximization, we can work out firms’ optimal outputs, aggregate quantity in






2KkˇS  kˇS+ c˜kˇS  kˇSrˇS+2c˜(kˇS)2+(kˇS)2rˇS 2(kˇS)2 2Kc˜kˇS KkˇSrˇS
kˇ(K+1)













from which we know that for any given kˇS, dPˇS/drˇS = kˇS/(K+ 1) > 0, thus
market price is increasing in rˇS for rˇS < c  c˜, and the licensor’s output, qˇS1 is
increasing in rˇS. Licensing fee from each licensee could be written as:
rˇSqˇSj =











we can see that for any kˇS  K  1, ∂ rˇ
SqˇSj
∂ rˇS   0 for rˇS  c  c˜, thus it is optimal
for licensor to set rˇS,⇤ = c  c˜ to maximize the licensing fee it could extract
from each licensee. Thus, it is equivalent to a problem without licensing. Then
market price is PˇS = 1  (K 1)q¯i  q¯1 where neither q¯i nor q¯1 depends on kˇS,
thus the licensor’s payoff from production does not depend on kˇS. So licensor
will license to all inefficient firms to maximize the payoff from licensing fee, i.e
kˇS,⇤ = K 1. The following lemma summarize the equilibrium.
Lemma 3.6. If the licensor has no option exit, the royalty auction subgame has
the following unique SPE:





















, and pˇS,⇤k =
(1+ c˜ 2c)2
(K+1)2
for all k 6= 1.
3.5.2 Licensor with option to exit
Now consider the licensor is forced to exit the market. Given the number of






pˇEi = (PˇE   c˜)qˇEi   rˇE qˇEi , i 2 G, and
pˇEj = (PˇE   c)qˇEj , j /2 G
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where PˇE = 1 ÂKl=1 qˇEl is the market price in Stage 3. Following Kaimen and
Tauman (1986), the patentee will licensee to all other firms (kˇE,⇤ = K  1),and
set the royalty rate as the magnitude of innovation rˇE,⇤ = c  c˜E . The following
lemma summarize the equilibrium results.
Lemma 3.7. (Kaimen and Tauman 1986). If the licensor has to exit the market,
the royalty auction subgame has a unique SPE in pure strategies:















, and pˇE,⇤k =
(1  c)2
K2
for all k 6= 1.
When licensor is allowed to exit the market, staying in the market always
yields higher profit for licensor for any magnitude of innovation. Since all firms
choose their pre-licensing output levels, consumer surplus remains the same
after licensing. Licensor gets the pre-licensing profit as well as licensing fee,
but the additional profit of licensor is offset by the additional investments in
patent competition. Overall, social welfare remains the same after licensing.
Proposition 3.5. For licensing with royalty, licensor stays in the market even
with an option to exit the market, regardless of the magnitude of innovation and
number of firm in the industry. Hence, licensing leads to no change in social
welfare.
Arrow (1962) shows that for perfect competition, it is optimal to set royalty
as magnitude of innovation so that licensing does not change the market price,
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and consumer surplus. Since producer surplus will be dissipated in the patent
competition, licensing has no effect on welfare as in Proposition 3.5.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the effect of licensing for firms competing in prod-
uct market engaging in a patent competition. Since licensing improves the profit
of the licensor, this increases duplication of research effort. As there will be only
one winner in the patent competition, the net change in producer surplus is am-
biguous. Moreover, licensing facilitates diffusion of technology and improves
consumer surplus. Under royalty auction, welfare effect of licensing is neu-
tral. Under licensing auction, the welfare effect of licensing is positive for large
innovations but negative for small innovations.
Our results are different from the results in existing literature that without
patent competition, in oligopoly market, licensing auction from the most effi-
cient firm to the least inefficient firm always increases social welfare (Creane,
Ko and Konishi 2013). In our paper, with patent competition, whether licensing
auction actual reduces social welfare small innovations. Mukherjee and Mjkher-
jee (2013) consider licensing with two-part tariff (fixed fee and royalty) but the
optimal pricing structure is zero fixed fee so it is in fact licensing with royalty.
They show that licensing with royalty increases social welfare. We show that
with patent competition, licensing with royalty leads to no change in social wel-
fare.
We also consider licensing with fixed fee, we examine licensor’s choice of
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production and the impact of licensing on social welfare. We analyze licensor’s
choice of production for different magnitude of innovation and it is difficult
to obtain a detailed result. For the impact of licensing on social welfare, we
present the result for different magnitude of innovation when licensor exits or
stays in the market and show that licensing generally reduces social welfare and
improves welfare only when innovation is intermediate.
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Chapter 4




Different forms of licensing policies such as licensing with fixed fee, licensing
with royalty have been studied, in early literature, a major finding is that li-
censing with fixed fee is superior to licensing with royalty for the patent holder.
In Kamien and Tauman (1986), licensing of a cost-reducing invention from an
outside innovator (licensor does not participate in product competition) to an
oligopolistic industry producing a homogeneous product by fixed fee or royalty
is examined and it is shown that the former form of licensing is preferred by
both the inventor and consumers. Kamien, Oren and Tauman (1992) compare
licensing with fixed fee auction, licensing with fixed fee and licensing with roy-
alty in terms of the patentees profit, licensees profit, industry structure, and the
products price. They show that when licensor does not participate in product
1This chapter is a joint paper with Assistant Professor Chiu Yu Ko, National University of
Singapore.
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competition, licensing with royalty is inferior to the other schemes, both for
consumers and the patentee. However, in recent literature, it is shown that un-
der certain circumstances, licensing with royalty could be superior to licensing
with fixed fee. In particular, Wang (1998) compares licensing with fixed fee
and licensing with royalty in a Cournot duopoly and finds that when licensor
participates in product competition, licensing with royalty could be preferred by
licensor when the innovation is nondrastic. Also, licensing with royalty is more
prevalent than licensing with fixed fee in the real market. We are interested in
licensing with royalty in oligopoly market, especially the comparison between
licensing with royalty and licensing with fixed fee.
The analysis in this paper is closely related to the results of Creane, Ko
and Konishi (2013) in which technology licensing with fixed fee auction in
oligopoly market is examined, it is assumed that firms including licensor com-
pete in Cournot competition, they differ in their constant marginal costs of pro-
duction and technology licensing reduces licensee’s marginal cost to the level
of the licensor’s. Firms make production decisions independently. It shows that
a complete technology licensing is always jointly profitable if the demand curve
is weakly concave, there are at least three firms in the market after licensing and
the remaining third firm’s marginal cost is different from the licensor’s. That
is, a complete licensing is always jointly profitable independent of its absolute
size and the relative efficiency of the licensor. They also focus on which part-
ner would maximize joint profit and they find that for weakly concave demand,
neither the very inefficient nor the very efficient rival maximizes joint profit. As
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for social welfare, they show that if the most efficient firm makes a complete
licensing then social welfare always increases under general demand.
Our analysis is also related to Wang (2002) which examines licensing with
royalty and licensing with fixed fee in a differentiated duopoly market. He con-
siders drastic and non-drastic cases, the main result is that when licensor partici-
pates in product competition, licensing with royalty may be superior to licensing
by means of a fixed fee for the licensor. However, fixed-fee licensing is always
preferred to royalty licensing for consumers.
In this paper, we examine technology licensing with royalty in oligopoly
market and divide the analysis into two parts, the first part is about nondrastic
licensing and the second part is about drastic licensing. Finally, as a supplemen-
tary analysis to Creane, Ko and Konishi (2013), we analyze drastic technology
licensing with fixed fee in oligopoly market.
In section 4.2, we consider nondrastic technology licensing with royalty
in oligopoly market, we analyze joint profit of licensor and licensee, industry
profit, consumer surplus as well as social welfare, and we compare technol-
ogy licensing with royalty and technology licensing with fixed fee to see which
one yields higher joint profit, consumer surplus, industry profit and social wel-
fare. In section 4.3.1, we focus on drastic technology licensing with royalty in
oligopoly market, i.e. the case in which non-licensed firms exit the market after
technology licensing. In section 4.3.2, we consider drastic technology licensing
with fixed fee as well, we analyze the joint profit, consumer surplus, industry
profit and social welfare after licensing.
76
4.2 Non-drastic licensing
In this section, we consider licensing with royalty in oligopoly market and we
focus on nondrastic licensing after which no firm exits the market. In Creane,
Ko and Konishi (2013), licensing with fixed fee in oligopoly market is examined
and joint profit of licensor and licensee, consumer surplus, industry profit and
social welfare are analyzed, here we will analyze licensing with per-output fee,
i.e. royalty and compare it with licensing with fixed fee.
4.2.1 Basic Model
We consider a Cournot market structure. There is a commodity with an inverse
demand function P= 1 Q and K firms with no fixed cost of production. Firms
are indexed as i 2 {1, ...,K} and differ in their constant marginal cost ci. Firms
are ordered by degree of efficiency: c1  c2  ... cK . Firm i’s production level
is denoted by qi. Without loss of generality, we assume firm 1 is the licensor and
it could license its technology to any other firm. Licencee’s marginal cost will
become equal to firm 1’s marginal cost, that is, we assume complete licensing
between firms, non-licensed firms’ outputs remain the same after licensing. We
adopt the standard assumption in the literature that firms make output decisions
independently before or after licensing.
We consider two types of licensing below:
(1) Licensing with fixed fee
Licensee pays licensor a fixed licensing fee to get its marginal cost reduced.
Following Creane, Ko and Konishi (2013), we know that fixed fee is determined
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by simple auction or menu auction. Here we consider a take-it-or-leave-it li-
censing scheme in which fixed fee is decided by licensor before licensing and
announced to the licensee, licensee chooses whether to accept it2. We adopt the
following timing assumptions.
• Stage 1: Firm 1 chooses a licensee and sets a fixed licensing fee for it,
licensee decides whether to accept licensing.
• Stage 2: All firms choose outputs to maximize their profits.
Each firm i chooses its output to maximize its profit below:
pi = (P  ci)qi, i= 1,2, ...,K.
From first-order conditions of profit maximization, the optimal outputs of firms
are:
qi =
1+Â j2{1,...,K}\{i} c j Kci
K+1
(4.1)
(2) Licensing with royalty
Instead of paying a fixed fee to get its marginal cost reduced, licensee has
to pay a per-output licensee fee, i.e, royalty to licensor for every unit of good it
produces. Royalty is decided by licensor before licensing and announced to the
licensee, for this take-it-or-leave-it licensing offer, licensee chooses whether to
accept it. Denote royalty as ri if firm i is the licensee, we adopt the following
timing assumptions.
2Since we are not interested in which firms gets the license, it does not matter the mechanism
to be adopted.In Creane, Ko and Konishi (2013), it is shown that for licensing with fixed fee,
joint profit maximizing licensee is neither the most efficient firm or the least efficient firm.
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• Stage 1: Firm 1 chooses a licensee and sets a per output licensing fee, i.e
royalty. Licensee decides whether to accept licensing.
• Stage 2: All firms choose outputs to maximize their profits. licensee pays
royalty for every unit of good it produces to licensor.
Suppose firm 1 licenses its technology to firm i, before licensing, each firm’s
optimal output is determined by (4.1), after licensing, each firm chooses its
output to maximize its profit below:
p1 = (P  c1)q1+ riqi
pi = (P  c1)qi  riqi
p j = (P  c j)q j, j 6= 1, i
Using the solution concept of subgame perfect equilibrium, the optimal royalty
ri and outputs chosen by firms are:








1+Âk2{1,...,K}\{i, j} ck+ c1+ ri Kcj
K+1
(4.4)
In the Appendix, we have examined how royalty changes as firms become
more inefficient. We will not work out which firm will be chosen as the licensee
in Stage 1 but we will examine how the joint profit of licensor and licensee
changes as the efficiency of licensee changes in the next subsection, we will
find the joint profit maximizing licensee.
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4.2.2 Technology Licensing with Royalty
In this section, we do some analysis about technology licensing with royalty.
Whether licensing is joint profit improving is an important issue since it deter-
mines whether licensor and licensee are willing to do the licensing. Katz and
Shapiro (1985) show that complete fixed fee licensing could reduce joint profits
in a duopoly, Creane, Ko and Konishi (2013) show that for licensing with fixed
fee auction, under weakly concave demand (which includes linear demand), a
complete technology licensing is always profitable if there is at least one other
firm with different marginal cost in the market after licensing. Now we consider
whether licensing with royalty increases joint profit of licensor and licensee, we
focus on licensing after which no firm exits the market, specifically. We find that
when royalty is high, licensing with royalty increases joint profit, when royalty
is low, licensing with royalty increases joint profit when number of firms is high
and may reduce joint profit when number of firms is low.
Proposition 4.1. : After non-drastic technology licensing with royalty,
(1) If ri = ci  c1, joint profit of licensor and licensee increases.
(2) If ri < ci  c1, when number of firms K   4, joint profit of licensor and
licensee increases, when K < 4, the influence of licensing with royalty on joint
profit of licensor and licensee is ambiguous.
When ri = ci  c1, licensee has to pay a royalty exactly equal to the amount
that its marginal cost is reduced by, thus it is equivalent to a problem in which
licensee’s marginal cost hasn’t been changed, so its output and profit won’t be
influenced. Since all firms choose their pre-licensing output levels, licensor
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could get its original profit as well as the revenue from licensing fee, thus its
profit will increase.
When ri < ci  c1, licensee’s marginal cost is reduced while it has to pay a
lower per output licensing fee to licensor, overall, its profit margin is increased,
thus its profit will increase. Market price is driven down since one of the firms
becomes more efficient. When there are more firms in the market, max{ci} is
higher, since no firm exits the market after licensing, we have P > ci for any i,
thus market price is driven down by less amount, profit of licensor is relatively
higher. When there are less firms in the market, max{ci} is lower, thus market
price is lower and licensor’s profit is lower. From the proof, we know that if
ri < ci  c1, licensor’s profit increases after licensing when there are more than
4 firms in the market and could increase or decrease after licensing when there
are less than 4 firms in the market. This is different from the conclusion in
Creane, Ko and Konishi (2013) which examines joint profit after licensing with
fixed fee. After we know that technology licensing is not always joint profit
increasing, we also want to know how the joint profit of licensor and licensee
changes as the efficiency of licensee changes since this will influence licensor’s
choice of licensee.
Proposition 4.2. : Joint profit maximizing licensee is neither the least efficient
firm nor the most efficient firm.
As to which partner would maximize joint profit, we get the same conclu-
sion as that of licensing with fixed fee auction in Creane, Ko and Konishi (2013),
joint profit maximizing licensee is neither the very inefficient nor the very effi-
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cient firm. On one hand, a technology licensing to a very efficient firm will not
reduce its margial cost much, thus the market price won’t be influenced much,
licensor or licensee’s profit won’t be increased much. On the other hand, a
technology licensing to a very inefficient firm will benefit the licensee much by
reducing its marginal cost by a relatively large amount, but licensor’s profit will
be reduced by a large amount since market price is driven down greatly. Thus
neither licensing to a very efficient firm nor licensing to a very inefficient firm
will maximize the joint profit of licensor and licensee.
4.2.3 Licensing with Royalty vs Licensing with Fixed Fee
In the previous section, we considered licensing with royalty, we examined roy-
alty and joint profit of licensor and licensee, now we will compare licensing
with fixed fee and licensing with royalty to see how these two types of licens-
ings differ in joint profit of licensor and licensee, consumer surplus, industry
profit and social welfare. As to joint profit and consumer surplus, we have the
following conclusion.
Licensing with royalty distorts firms’ outputs because licensee’s output is
influenced by both licensor’s marginal cost and royalty while licensing with
fixed fee does not. In most circumstances, neither licensor nor licensee wants its
output to be distorted, thus they prefer technology licensing with fixed fee. This
is analogy in public economics literature that lump-sum tax is always superior
to any other type of tax.
Proposition 4.3. : Licensing with fixed fee yields higher joint profit of licensor
and licensee, higher consumer surplus.
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After licensing with royalty or licensing with fixed fee, one of the inefficient
firms becomes more efficient, total output is higher in the market after any type
of licensing, thus consumers get higher surplus. When we compare licensing
with fixed fee and licensing with royalty, market price is higher after licensing
with royalty than that of licensing with fixed fee, because of the negative rela-
tionship between market price and total output, there is larger total output after
licensing with fixed fee than licensing with royalty. Consumer surplus is higher
after licensing with fixed fee than licensing with royalty. Thus, for consumers,
licensing with fixed fee is more desirable.
Now we examine whether licensing with fixed fee or licensing with royalty
yields higher industry profit and social welfare. In Katz and Shapiro (1985),
it is shown that in a duopoly a technology licensing can reduce welfare, but
only when it reduces joint profit. Creane, Ko and Konishi (2013) show that a
complete licensing with fixed fee auction from the most efficient firm to any
inefficient firm increases social welfare. As we have analyzed technology li-
censing with royalty, we want to know whether it leads to higher or lower social
welfare compared to licensing with fixed fee. The policy implication of this
concern is whether licensing with fixed fee or licensing with royalty should be
encouraged by social planner. Since social welfare comprises of consumer sur-
plus and industry profit and we have already shown that licensing with fixed fee
yields higher consumer surplus, now we provide conclusion regarding industry
profit and social welfare.
Proposition 4.4. : For technology licensing with royalty and technology licens-
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ing with fixed fee, if no firm exits the market after licensings:
(1) When ri < ci  c1, licensing with fixed fee yields higher industry profit
and social welfare.
(2) When ri = ci  c1, if ÂKk 6=i(ck  c1)< K 1K+3 , licensing with fixed fee yields
higher industry profit and social welfare. Otherwise licensing with royalty yields
higher industry profit, whether licensing with royalty yields social welfare is
ambiguous.
When ri < ci  c1, technology is not very desirable to firms and firms do
not want their outputs to be distorted, thus they prefer technology licensing
with fixed fee. When ri = ci  c1, technology is very desirable to firms, when
ÂKk 6=i(ck  c1) < K 1K+3 , c1 is not very small compared to ck,k 6= i, firms’ outputs
will not be distorted much, thus they prefer technology licensing with royalty,
otherwise their outputs will be distorted much and they prefer technology li-
censing with fixed fee. As we have shown before, licensing with fixed fee yields
higher consumer surplus regardless of royalty in the market.
4.3 Drastic technology licensing
In the previous section, we investigate licensing with royalty after which non-
licensed firms remain in the market, now we focus on licensing after which
non-licensed firms exit the market. As one of the inefficient firms becomes more
efficient, market price will be driven down after licensing, which also reduces
non-licensed firms’ profit, in an extreme situation, if market price is lower than
some firms’ marginal costs, they will be driven out of the market, then market
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structure may be changed. Due to tractability, we adopt a simple setup that there
are two groups of firms in the market, one efficient group and one inefficient
group, firms in each group have the same marginal cost and marginal costs in
the two groups are different. We first consider a general model that both groups
consist of more than one firms. Then we consider a special case when there is
only one firm in the efficient group and more than one firm in the inefficient
group. The influence of licensing is huge in this special case because after
non-licensed firms exit the market, market structure changes from oligopoly to
duopoly. From this example, we can see that drastic licensing in different market
is worth studying and whether it should be encouraged is an important policy
implication.
We consider licensing with royalty and licensing with fixed fee, in both
cases, we begin our analysis by assuming a oligopoly Cournot market consists
of E   1 efficient firms who have marginal cost c⇤ and K E > 0 inefficient
firms who have marginal cost c in the market, c⇤ < c. One of the efficient firms
licenses its technology to one of the inefficient firms. We assume a complete
licensing, i.e. after licensing, licensee’s marginal cost becomes c⇤, other firms’
marginal costs remain the same. So there are E+1 firms who have marginal cost
c⇤ and K E 1 firms who have marginal cost c in the market after licensing.
4.3.1 Drastic technology licensing with royalty
For licensing with royalty, we assume that licensee pays a per-output licensing
fee, i.e. royalty to licensor for every unit of good it produces. Without loss
of generality, we assume firm 1 is the licensor. Also, we adopt the standard
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assumption in the literature that firms make output decisions independently after
any licensing. We adopt the timing assumption in Section 4.2.
Denote firm k’s output as qk, profit as pk, before licensing, profits of firms
are written as:
pk = (P  c⇤)qk,1 k  E
pk = (P  c)qk,E < k  K
in which P refers to the market price and P= 1 Q= 1 ÂKk=1 qk.
From first order condition of profit maximization, we can work out the op-



























)2,E  k  K
To make sure all firms produce in the market, we need P> c> c⇤, which gives
us






2EK+3K+E 1 , we have the following conclusion.
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When c is relatively lower (0 < c < t2), licensee’s efficiency level is not
changed much and market price is not lowered much after licensing, thus non-
licensed inefficient firms will not have much profit loss because of licensing and
they will not be forced out of the market.
Proposition 4.5. When t2 < c< t⇤, non-licensed inefficient firms exit the market
after licensing, joint profit of licensor and licensee increases, whether industry
profit increases or decreases is ambiguous, consumer surplus and social welfare
increase after licensing.
When c is relatively higher (t2 < c < t⇤), non-licensed inefficient firms will
be driven out of the market since market price will be driven down much. Li-
censee accepts the licensing since it gains higher profit after licensing, licensor’s
profit from production decreases because of lower market price but it is com-
pensated by the revenue from licensing fee. Overall, joint profit of licensor and
licensee increases, thus they are willing to do the licensing. However, as non-
licensed inefficient firms exit the market and non-licensed efficient firms also
have loss because of lower market price, whether industry profit increases is
ambiguous. Consumers are benefited from licensing since lower market price
brings higher total output in the market, licensing also increases social welfare.
As we said before, if there is one efficient firm and K 1 inefficient firms in
the market, after non-licensed inefficient firms exit the market, market structure
will be very different and industry profit will be influenced greatly. Thus we
investigate this special case, we have the following conclusion.
Proposition 4.6. When c⇤K2+c⇤+K+3K2+K+4 < c <
1+c⇤
2 , if licensee accepts licensing,
87
it has to exit the market and only licensor remains in the market. Consumer
surplus, industry profit and social welfare decrease.
When c is relatively lower (0 < c < c
⇤K2+c⇤+K+3
K2+K+4 ), licensee accepts licens-
ing and ri = c c⇤, in this case, all firms choose their pre-licensing outputs, thus
non-licensed inefficient firms won’t exit the market. When c is relatively higher
( c
⇤K2+c⇤+K+3
K2+K+4 < c <
1+c⇤
2 ), non-licensed inefficient firms will exit the market.
Since there’s only one efficient firm in the market before licensing, market be-
comes a duopoly if licensee accepts licensing, for the royalty set by licensor, if
licensee produces, it will gain negative profit. Thus it is optimal for licensee to
stop producing if it accepts licensing, the whole industry and society are harmed
by such licensing. Anticipating this, licensee won’t accept licensing at the be-
ginning.
4.3.2 Drastic technology licensing with fixed fee
In Creane, Ko and Konishi (2013), technology licensing with fixed fee auction
in oligopoly market is examined, weakly concave demand is adopted, firms are
assumed to have heterogeneous marginal costs, non-drastic and drastic licens-
ing are both considered. In this section, we examine licensing with fixed fee.
Without loss of generality, we assume firm 1 is the licensor. Also, we adopt the
standard assumption in the literature that firms make output decisions indepen-
dently before or after any licensing. We adopt the timing assumption in Section
4.2.
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Before licensing, profits of firms are written as:
pk = (P  c⇤)qk,1 k  E
pk = (P  c)qk,E  k  K
in which P refers to the market price and P = 1 Q = 1 ÂKk=1 qk. From first
order condition of profit maximization, we can work out the optimal output of


































)2,E  k  K
To make sure all firms produce in the market, we need P > c > c⇤, if after
licensing, firms with marginal cost c exit the market, we must have c⇤ < P< c,
thus we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. If there are 1 < E < K efficient firm and K E inefficient firms
in the market before licensing and non-licensed inefficient firms exit the market
after one of the efficient firm licenses its technology to one of the inefficient firms,






After licensing, profit functions of those remaining firms are
pF = (1 QF   c⇤)qF









Thus any firmwill be willing to pay F = (1 c
⇤)2
(E+2)2 to get technology licensing from






profit of licensor and licensee before licensing as JP, joint profit after licensing
as JPF , industry profit before licensing as IP, industry profit after licensing as
IPF , we have the following conclusion.
Proposition 4.7. When there are E efficient firms and K E inefficient firms
in the market, when c 2 (1+(E+1)c⇤E+2 , 1+Ec
⇤
E ), non-licensed inefficient firms exit
the market after one of the efficient firms licenses its technology to one of the
inefficient firms, joint profit of licensor and licensee increases after licensing,
JPF   JP is decreasing in c for c 2 (1+(E+1)c⇤E+2 , 1+Ec
⇤
E ). Consumer surplus in-
creases after licensing, whether industry profit increases or decreases after li-
censing is ambiguous and IPF IP is decreasing in c for c2 (1+(E+1)c⇤E+2 , 1+Ec
⇤
E ),
social welfare increases after licensing.
In Creane, Ko and Konishi (2013), it is shown that after licensing with fixed
fee auction, if another firm with different marginal cost remains in the market,
joint profit of licensor and licensee increases, now we have shown that when
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non-licensed inefficient firms exit the market after licensing, while there are
some other firms with the same marginal cost remaining in the market, joint
profit of licensor and licensee also increases. This is a supplementary result to
the one in Creane, Ko and Konishi (2013). Joint profit after licensing doesn’t
depend on c, but joint profit before licensing increases in c, thus the change of
industry profit decreases in c.
When non-licensed inefficient firms exit the market after licensing, only ef-
ficient firms remain in the market, thus market price is driven down greatly and
total output is increased much, thus consumers get higher surpus in the market.
Non-licensed inefficient firms exit the market after licensing, efficient firms have
loss since market price is driven down while joint profit of licensor and licensee
increases, thus the influence of licensing on industry profit is ambiguous. Indus-
try profit after licensing doesn’t depend on c, but industry profit before licensing
increases in c, thus the change of industry profit decreases in c.
About social welfare, we present a result of Creane, Ko, Konishi (2013)
that a technology licensing from the most efficient firm to a less efficient firm
increases social welfare.
Observation 1 (Creane, Ko, Konishi (2013)): Suppose that the most efficient
firm (firm 1) makes a complete transfer to any firm j (c1  c2  ... c j... cK
and c1 < c j ). Then, the social welfare improves.
Applying this observation to the present case, we are considering a complete
technology licensing from firm 1 to firm i and c⇤ < ci,ci = c, thus we have that
social welfare increases after licensing.
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We consider a special case of drastic technology licensing which is based on
fixed fee. When there is one dominant firm and K 1 fringe firms in the market,
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.8. When there is 1 efficient firm and K   1 inefficient firms in
the market, non-licensed firms exit the market after the efficient firm licenses
its technology to one of the inefficient firms, joint profit of licensor and licensee
decreases, consumer surplus increases, industry profit decreases, social surplus
increases after licensing.
We show that both licensor and licensee have loss after technology licensing,
thus joint profit of licensor and licensee decreases after licensing. Thus without
any government subsidy to licensor or licensee, such licensing will not take
place between firms.
After licensing, firms other than licensor and licensee exit the market, only
two firms who have lower marginal cost remain in the market, market price has
been reduced by a large amount and total output has been increased greatly in
the market, also, consumer surplus has increased. So such licensing is not desir-
able to firms but it is beneficial to consumers, government may be willing to give
subsidy to licensor and licensee to make the licensing take place. After licens-
ing, non-licensed inefficient firms exit the market, the remaining firms, licensor
and licensee both have profit loss, thus such licensing harms the entire industry.
After licensing, even though industry profit decreases much, consumer surplus
increases by a larger amount and social welfare increases. Such a licensing is
harmful to industry, but it is socially desirable. Thus government may choose to
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subsidize licensor and licensee to encourage such a licensing.
4.4 Conclusion
We analyze technology licensing with royalty when no firm exits the market af-
ter licensing. In contrast to Creane, Ko and Konishi (2013), for licensing with
fixed fee auction, joint profit is shown to be always increasing as long as another
firm with different marginal cost remains in the market, we find that joint profit
of licensor and licensee may increase or decrease. As to which partner would
maximize joint profit, we get the same conclusion as that of Creane, Ko and
Konishi (2013), joint profit maximizing licensee is neither the very inefficient
nor the very efficient firm. We compare the consumer surplus and social welfare
after licensing with royalty and licensing with fixed fee, we find that licensing
with fixed fee yields higher consumer surplus. When royalty is lower, licensing
with fixed fee yields higher industry profit since firms do not want their outputs
to be distorted, when royalty is higher and licensee is very efficient, licensee
prefers licensing with royalty since its output won’t be distorted much, other-
wise licensee prefers licensing with fixed fee.
For drastic technology licensing, we consider licensing with royalty and li-
censing with fixed fee, respectively. For licensing with royalty, when there are
several efficient firms and several inefficient firms in the market, joint profit of
licensor and licensee increases, we show that consumer surplus also increases.
Since firms other than licensor and licensee have loss after licensing, industry
profit could increase or decrease. The overall effect is an increase of social
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welfare. For a special case when there is only one efficient firm and several
inefficient firms in the market, if licensee accepts the licensing, it is optimal for
licensee to stop producing and only licensor will remain in the market, joint
profit of licensor and licensee, consumer surplus, industry profit and social wel-
fare will decrease. Thus probably such a licensing will not take place.
For licensing with fixed fee, when there are several efficient firms and several
inefficient firms in the market, we find that after licensing takes place, if non-
licensed inefficient firms exit the market, joint profit of licensor and licensee
increases, this is a supplementary result to Creane, Ko and Konishi (2013) in
which when there is another firm with different marginal cost remaining in the
market after licensing, joint profit increases. We show that consumer surplus
also increases, industry profit could increase or decrease and we have an in-
crease of social welfare. For a special case when there is one efficient firm and
several inefficient firms in the market, we show that joint profit of licensor and
licensee decrease after licensing, industry profit also decreases after licensing.
However, since market price has been greatly driven down, total output is higher
after licensing, thus consumer surplus is much higher after licensing. Also, the
increase of consumer surplus overwhelms the decrease of industry profit, thus
we have an increase of social welfare.
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Appendix of Chapter 1
Appendix I: Perloff-Salop model
In this appendix we detail the Perloff-Salop model of product differentiation
and show how it gives rise to our merchant internalization condition and other
assumptions. There are n sellers. We assume that each buyer obtains match
value ei of buying from seller i, for i = 1, ...,n. The match value is assumed to
be an independently and identically drawn random variable across buyers and
sellers from the common density f over some interval which is a subset ofR and
has lowest value e . The density f is assumed to be continuously differentiable
and log-concave, which ensures the existence and uniqueness of the sellers’
pricing equilibrium (Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991) among symmetric equilibria.
Sellers have a unit cost d per unit sold. To keep buyers ex-ante homogenous, we
assume each buyer only observes e1, ...,en after deciding whether to join the card
platform, but before choosing which seller to buy from. The (indirect) utility of
no purchase is normalized to zero. Thus, to ensure buyers always prefer to buy
from one of the sellers, possibly directly, rather than not buy at all, we need to
assume e is sufficiently high.
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Consider sellers in a sector defined by bS. Consider a proposed equilibrium
in which no sellers accept cards. A buyer will choose seller i if ei  pi   e j  p j






ei+ p j  pi
 
f (ei)dei.
As shown in Perloff and Salop (1985), there is a unique symmetric equilibrium
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An important property of this equilibrium is that each seller obtains the same
margin (i.e. 1M(n) ) and the same probability of a sale (i.e.
1














Assume buyers obtain the surplus (net of fees and rebates) avB (pB) for any
transaction in which they use cards, and sellers obtain the corresponding surplus
bS  pS, where 0  a  1. Note the parameter a could capture that buyers
discount the expected surplus vB (pB) from using cards, for instance, because
they do not fully take it into account when choosing which seller to buy from.
Suppose all buyers hold cards.
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Now suppose seller i considers deviating from the proposed equilibrium
above by accepting cards, adjusting its price to p0i. Buyers that choose seller i ob-
tain the expected surplus from using cards, which they perceive to be avB (pB)DB (pB).
Buyers will then choose seller i if ei  p0i+avB (pB)DB (pB)   e j  p⇤ for all
j 6= i. Seller i’s deviation profit is therefore

































Comparing (A.2) with (A.1), it is clear that p 0i > p⇤ if pS  bS < avB (pB),
p 0i = p⇤ if pS   bS = avB (pB) and p 0i < p⇤ if pS   bS > avB (pB). There-
fore, there is an equilibrium in which sellers do not accept cards if pS > bS+
avB (pB), consistent with our assumption in (1.3).
Now consider a proposed equilibrium in which all sellers in the sector accept
cards. Then the additional benefit that buyers expect to get from using cards does
not affect their choice of seller. The problem is identical to that in (A.1) except
sellers’ marginal cost is increased by (pS bS)DB (pB), reflecting the higher net
cost faced by sellers for transactions which are made with cards. In particular,
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the equilibrium common price becomes
p⇤ = d+(pS bS)DB (pB)+ 1M (n) ,
while each seller’s equilibrium profit remains at p⇤.
Suppose seller i considers deviating and rejects cards and adjusts its price to
p0i. Buyers that choose seller i give up the expected surplus from using cards,
which they perceive to be avB (pB)DB (pB). Buyers will then choose seller i if

















Comparing (A.3) with (A.1), it is clear that p 0i > p⇤ if pS  bS > avB (pB),
p 0i = p⇤ if pS  bS = avB (pB) and p 0i < p⇤ if pS  bS < avB (pB). Therefore,
there is an equilibrium in which all sellers accept cards if pS  bS+avB (pB),
consistent with our assumption in (1.3).
Finally, we need each buyer to always be willing to purchase one unit. Note
buyers will only use cards if bB   pB. Suppose a buyer draws the worst possible
match value e and the lowest value of bB, in which case they will not use cards
for the purchase. Then for the buyer to still want to complete the purchase it
must be that
e > d+(pS bS)DB (pB)+ 1M (n) .
Since (pS bS)DB (pB) = avB (pB)DB (pB) which is decreasing in pB, a suffi-
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cient condition to ensure buyers always want to complete their purchases is




Thus, assuming this condition on e holds, we have a model with n competing
sellers that satisfies all the assumptions required for our analysis.
Appendix II: Proofs
Proof of marginal cost pricing for Proposition 1.1
Consider the case with perfect price discrimination. We would like to formally
establish that for any a(bS) set by the platform, the issuer will want to set
p⇤B (bS) = cB a(bS) to maximize its profit. To show this, consider any function
p0B (bS) and bS 2 [b1S,b2S]⇢ [bˆS,bS]. Denote (1.4) evaluated at p⇤B (bS) as p⇤ and
(1.4) evaluated at p0B (bS) as p0.
If p0B (bS) < p
⇤








p0B (bS)  p⇤B (bS)
 







p0B (bS)  p⇤B (bS)
 






























(bB  p⇤B (bS)) dHB (bB)dHS (bS) (A.9)
< 0.
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Note that focusing on bS 2 [b1S,b2S] in which p0 and p⇤ differ, p0 can be decom-
posed into the equations (A.4)-(A.7) using that p⇤B (bS) = cB a(bS), while p⇤
becomes (A.8). Then the equality in (A.9) follows from adding the terms in
(A.5) and (A.7) since (A.4) and (A.6) cancel with (A.8).








p0B (bS)  p⇤B (bS)
 







p0B (bS)  p⇤B (bS)
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(p⇤B (bS) bB) dHB (bB)dHS (bS) (A.15)
< 0.
Note that focusing on bS 2 [b1S,b2S] in which p0 and p⇤ differ, p0 can be decom-
posed into the equations (A.10)-(A.13) using that p⇤B (bS) = cB  a(bS), while
p⇤ becomes (A.14). Then the equality in (A.15) follows from adding the terms
in (A.11) and (A.13) since the terms in (A.10) and (A.12) cancel with (A.14).
Thus, for any partition of [bˆS,bS] into sets for which pB (bS) > p0B (bS),
pB (bS)< p0B (bS) and pB (bS) = p
0
B (bS), these results imply we must have p0 <
p⇤. This shows that the issuer does best with the conditional fee function
p⇤B (bS) = cB  a(bS). Note this fee is never below bB. This is proven in Sec-
tion B.1.1 of the Supplementary Appendix.
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Proof of Lemma 1.1
As with perfect price discrimination, the platform will want to choose bˆS such
that all sellers with bS   bˆS will participate and all those with a lower level of




denote the issuer’s optimal choice of pB given bˆS. The
platform will set the interchange fee schedule to extract all possible surplus from
those sellers accepting, implying











    cS if bS < bˆS. (A.16)
Given the platform’s optimal interchange fee schedule, we know that sellers












    cS a⇤ (bS) of accepting cards, which given (A.16) is just
zero. Thus, (1.3) holds and sellers will accept cards in equilibrium.
In stage 1 the platform will fix bˆS in (A.16) to maximize its profit. Since
acquirers are perfectly competitive, the platform’s profit is just the issuer’s profit.





that are set in stage 2 to maximize the issuer’s profit:







(pB  cB+a(bS))DB (pB) dHS (bS) .





























  avB  p⇤B  bˆS   . (A.19)
























< bB for any bˆS (see
Section B.2.1 in the Supplementary Appendix), and is the unique global max-
imizer (see Section B.2.2 in the Supplementary Appendix). Note from (A.20)




will be decreasing in bˆS, given that bS is
strictly increasing in bˆS.
Now consider the platform’s choice of bˆS in stage 1. Since the platform’s




already maximizes the issuer’s
profit for a given bˆS, we can ignore the effect of changing bˆS on the issuer’s



























   avB  p⇤B  bˆ⇤S   . (A.22)
To show that (A.21) defines the global maximum, note first that we can rule
out a corner solution, so the solution bˆ⇤S satisfies bS < bˆ⇤S < bS (see Section B.2.3
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in the Supplementary Appendix). We can also show the uniqueness of bˆ⇤S as a
maximizer (see Section B.2.4 in the Supplementary Appendix).
Together (A.19) and (A.22) uniquely characterize the global maximum. Fi-
nally, the solution exists given that the issuer’s profit function is continuous





, the equilibrium conditions (A.19) and (A.22) are equivalent to (1.10)
and (1.11) as stated in the lemma.







(bB+bS  c) dHS (bS)dHB (bB) .
Consider the welfare maximizing outcome in which the planner can set pB and
bˆS directly, setting bˆS in a first stage, and then pB. Note that in Lemma 1.1,
when a = 0, the platform’s objective function corresponds exactly to social
welfare and following the proof in Lemma 1.1, the welfare maximizing outcome
is (1.12) and (1.13).
Now we will show that the planner will select multiple interchange fees
a(bS) to achieve this welfare maximizing outcome when the issuer sets pB to
maximize its profit. Since competitive acquirers will set p⇤S (a(bS)) = cS+a(bS)
for the seller who has convenience benefit of bS, sellers with bS   p⇤S (a(bS)) 
avB (pB (a˜))will accept cards, in which a˜ is the weighted average of interchange












From (A.18), we know that given multiple interchange fees, the issuer will set
p⇤B (a˜) = cB  a˜
To achieve the welfare maximizing outcome, for any 0 a  1, the planner
can set the following interchange fees:
aW (bS) = bS  cS if bS   bˆWS






if bS < bˆWS ,
(A.23)
in which pWB and bˆ
W
S are given by (1.12) and (1.13). Thus the average of in-
terchange fees is a˜W = bS
 
bˆWS
   cS. Substituting this interchange fee into
p⇤B (a˜) = cB  a˜ gives (1.12). (Sections B.2.1 and B.2.2 in the Supplementary
Appendix confirm p⇤B (a˜) is the unique maximizer and not a corner solution for
any 0  a  1.) From (A.23) we know that bˆWS is given by (1.13). Thus, the
interchange fees aW deliver the welfare maximizing outcome for any 0 a  1.
Proof of Proposition 1.3
From (A.16) and (A.23), we know that aW (bS)< a⇤ (bS) for bS  max(bˆ⇤S, bˆWS )
whenever a > 0. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that bˆ⇤S < bˆWS .
This raises the possibility that the weighted average interchange fee could still
be higher when set by the planner, and further analysis is required in order to
compare average interchange fees.

















When a = 0, the first order conditions (A.24)-(A.25) are identical to (A.26)-
(A.27), thus the solutions are the same regardless of whether interchange fees
are set by the platform or planner. The remainder of the proof concerns the case
a > 0.
To cover all possibilities, we need to consider four possible cases: (i) c 
bˆ⇤S  bB and c  p⇤B  bS; (ii) c  bˆ⇤S > bB and c  p⇤B > bS; (iii) c  bˆ⇤S  bB and
c  p⇤B > bS; and (iv) c  bˆ⇤S > bB and c  p⇤B  bS. The proofs in each case
are very similar. We show the proof for case (i) below, and since they are quite
lengthy, establish the other three cases in Section B.3 of the Supplementary
Appendix.
Recall that 0 < b 0B (pB) < 1 for bB < pB < bB. The Mean Value Theorem
implies that b (p0B) b (pB)< p0B  pB for any p0B > pB, where bB < p0B < bB, or
equivalently p0B< b
 1
B (bB (pB)+ p0B  pB). Let p0B= p⇤B+avB (p⇤B)> p⇤B. Note
p0B < bB (p⇤B)< bB given p⇤B < bB. Then the inequality implies p⇤B+avB (p⇤B)<










where the right hand side is well defined given that c  bˆ⇤S  bB. By the same




< 1 for any bS < bˆS < bS, we must have








. Using (A.24) and (A.25), this is
equivalent to
c bB (p⇤B)< b 1S (c  p⇤B) , (A.29)
where the right hand side is well defined given that c  p⇤B  bS.




























cal axis. From (A.26), we define the curve bˆ0S (pB) = b
 1
S (c  pB) through the
point (pWB ,bˆ
W
S ) which is labelled D. Note this is downward sloping with a slope
with magnitude everywhere greater than 1. From (A.27), we define the curve
bˆ1S (pB) = c bB (pB) through the point (pWB ,bˆWS ). Note this is downward slop-
ping with a slope with magnitude everywhere less than 1. Note the location of
bB and bS in Figure A.1 follows given the inequalities given in case (i).
Suppose that point A in Figure A.1 represents the intersection point of (A.24)
and (A.25). We know this exists and is unique from Lemma 1.1. We have
bˆ1S (p
⇤
B) = c  bB (p⇤B) > c  bB (p⇤B)  avB(p⇤B) = bˆ⇤S where the last equality
comes from (A.24). Thus, projecting point A onto the curve bˆ1S (p
⇤
B) vertically,
we have the point B in Figure A.1, which is above point A. From (A.24) and
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  avB(p⇤B) = p⇤B .
Thus, projecting point A onto the curve bˆ1S (p
⇤
B) horizontally, we will have point
F in Figure A.1, which is to the right of point A. Also, since c  bˆ⇤S  bB by
assumption, we have point F which is to the left of or on the line pB = bB.
















    bˆS for any bˆS, we must have bˆS   b 1S  bˆS  for




. Thus, we have pointH which is




S (c  p⇤B)> c bB (p⇤B) =
bˆ1S (p
⇤
B) where the inequality follows from (A.29). Thus, we have pointC which
is above point B in Figure A.1. Also, since c  p⇤B  bS by assumption, we have
pointC which is below or on the line bˆS = bS.
If we project point A horizontally onto the curve bˆ0S (pB) = b
 1
S (c  pB),

















corresponds to pB at point F ,
where the inequality follows from (A.28), implying point E is to the left of
point F in Figure A.1.
The other figures (in Section B.3 of the Supplementary Appendix) illustrate
similar properties as that shown in Figure A.1. In each case, the intersection
point of the curves bˆ0S (pB) and bˆ
1
S (pB) is just the unique point D (i.e. p
W
B and
bˆWS ). Therefore, it follows from the properties established for the figures that we

















Denote the weighted average of the interchange fees that arise when inter-









From (A.18), we know that p⇤B = cB  a˜⇤. Also, from Lemma 1.2, we know that
pWB = cB  a˜W . Thus, we must have a˜⇤> a˜W , i.e. that the weighted average of the
platform’s profit maximizing interchange fees exceeds the weighted average of
welfare maximizing interchange fees. Note bˆWS > bˆ
⇤
S implies that the indifferent
seller is of a higher type under the planner’s solution, so more sellers accept
cards when interchange fees are set by the platform.
Proof of Proposition 1.4
We will compare the privately and socially optimal interchange fees indirectly
by comparing each with the interchange fee maximizing the number of card
transactions. Denoting the number of card transactions as T , so





The first order condition with respect to a is
dT (a)
da
= hB (p⇤B (a))DS
 
bˆS (a)
  DB (p⇤B (a))hS  bˆS (a)  1+av0B (p⇤B (a))  .




|a=a⇤ = hB (p⇤B (a⇤))DS
 
bˆS (a⇤)







(DB (p⇤B (a⇤)) hB (p⇤B (a⇤))vB (p⇤B (a⇤))) .
To sign DB (p⇤B) hB (p⇤B)vB (p⇤B)> 0, recall the definition of vB (pB) is
vB (pB) =
R b¯B




Using DB (bB) = 1 HB (bB) and integrating (A.30) by parts, we get
vB (pB) =
R b¯B
pB DB (bB) dbB
DB (pB)
.
Taking the derivative with respect to pB, we get
v0B (pB) =
 DB (pB)DB (pB)  vB (pB)DB (pB)D0B (pB)
D2B (pB)
= DB (pB) hB (pB)vB (pB)
DB (pB)
.
Thus, from v0B (pB) < 0, we have DB (pB) hB (pB)vB (pB) > 0. We must have
dT (a)
da < 0 at a= a
⇤. From log-concavity of T , we know that the interchange fee
which maximizes number of transactions, denoted aT , is lower than privately
optimal interchange fee. I.e., aT < a⇤.






(bB+bS  c) dHS (bS)dHB (bB) .























Note the second term is proportional to the platform’s profit given in (1.16). In
case a = 1, the second term does not arise. Taking the derivative of W1 with



















hB (p⇤B (a)) .







































Evaluate dT (a)da at a



























































































⇤  DS  bˆS  aW1    vS  bˆS  aW1  hS  bˆS  aW1    .




   vS  bˆS (a) hS  bˆS (a) > 0.
Thus we have dT (a)da > 0 at a = a
W1 . From log-concavity of W1, we know that
aT > aW1 . As we have shown that aT < a⇤, we have a⇤ > aW1 .
We claim that aW which maximizes total welfare, lies in (aW1 , a⇤), since
otherwise we could find a which increases bothW1 and platform’s profit. (The
only exception is if a = 1, in which case aW = aW1 and the result is already
established.) For instance, if aW  aW1 , then we can increase W1 and the plat-
form’s profit by increasing a, contradicting the optimality of aW . Symmetrically,
if aW   a⇤, then we can increaseW1 and the platform’s profit by decreasing a,
contradicting the optimality of aW . Thus, we must have aW in (aW1 , a⇤), which























Supplementary Appendix of Chapter 1
This supplementary appendix provides some technical proofs and additional
results for Chapter 1.
B.1 Corner solutions, uniqueness and existence
This first section contains the formal proofs where we claimed in the main text
that corner solutions can be ruled out, and where we claimed the uniqueness or
existence of particular solutions. The second section covers the other similar
cases in the proof of Proposition 1.3.
B.1.1 The conditional fee function p⇤B (bS) is well defined
Denote qB (pB) = abB (pB)+(1 a)pB. Since qB (pB) is strictly increasing in
pB with slope less than 1, we have p⇤B (bS) = q
 1
B (c bS). We want to show
the conditional fee function p⇤B (bS) is such that pB is never below bB, so that
it is well defined. Since E (bB)+ bS < E (bB)+ bS < c, we have (1 a)bB+
bB (bB) < bB (bB) < c  bS, and so bB < q 1B (c bS). Since the slope of qB is
less than 1, it follows we have p⇤B (bS)> bB for any bS.
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B.1.2 Proof of uniqueness of bˆ⇤S





















































since p⇤B (bS) =
q 1B (c bS) and q 1B is an increasing function so that p⇤B (bS) is a decreasing
function of bS. Thus, dp/dbˆS > 0 if bˆS < bˆ⇤S. Using a symmetric argument,






= 0 indeed characterizes the unique
global maximum of p at bˆ⇤S.
B.2 Almost Perfect Price Discrimination
B.2.1 Ruling out corner solution of p⇤B




= bB, then no buyers would ever use cards,
so there would be no transactions (i.e. pI = 0) which would not be optimal. (The
only exception is if bˆS is set such that bS
 
bˆS





































   c D0B (bB)DS  bˆS  0.













so the issuer will set pB above bB.
B.2.2 Proof of uniqueness of p⇤B




























B.2.3 Ruling out corner solution of bˆ⇤S
Proof. To see this, note that if bˆ⇤S = bS, then no sellers would ever accept cards,
so there would be no transactions (i.e. pI = 0) which would not be optimal.
Alternatively, if bˆ⇤S = bS then E (bS) = bS (bS) and we have c  bS (bS) > bB









(A.20) we can replace the left hand side of this inequality with abB (p⇤B (bS))+
(1 a) p⇤B (bS). Since bB (p⇤B (bS))   abB (p⇤B (bS))+ (1 a) p⇤B (bS), we have
p⇤B (bS)> bB. In other words, vB (p⇤B (bS)) = 0, buyers will never use cards and
pI = 0. Thus bˆS = bS does not maximize pI .
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B.2.4 Proof of uniqueness of bˆ⇤S
















   vB  p⇤B  bˆS   DB  p⇤B  bˆS  hS  bˆS  ,






















































creasing in bˆS for bˆS < bS. Thus, dpI/dbˆS > 0 if bˆS < bˆ⇤S. Using a symmetric
argument, dpI/dbˆS < 0 if bˆS > bˆ⇤S. Thus (A.22) indeed characterizes the unique
global maximum of pI at bˆ⇤S.
B.3 Additional cases for Proof of Proposition 1.3
Case (ii). Now consider Figure B.1 which is defined in the same way as Figure
A.1. Points A, B, G and H are characterized in the same way. From the proof
in case (i), we know that point A is below point B and point G is above point H.
Since c bB (p⇤B) bS
 
bˆ⇤S
  bS, point B is below or on the line bˆS = bS. By as-
















Thus, we have point G is above point A and point A is above point H. Project-


































= p⇤B+avB (p⇤B) bB, we have point E is
to the left of or on the line pB = bB. Finally, at bS = bS, we have point C which
is defined by (c bS,bS). Since c bS > p⇤B by assumption, we have point C is
to the right of point A.
Case (iii): Now consider Figure B.2 which is defined in the same way as
Figure A.1. Points A, B, G and H are characterized in the same way. From
the proof in case (i), we know that point A is below point B and point G is
above point H. Since c bB (p⇤B) bS
 
bˆ⇤S
  bS, point B is below or on the line
bˆS = bS. Also, since bˆ⇤S   c  bB by assumption, we have point A is above or
horizontally as high as point G. Projecting point A onto curve bˆ1S horizontally,








. Since c  bˆ⇤S < bB









































. From the proof in case (i), we know point E is to





Since c bS > p⇤B by assumption, we must have point C is to the right of point
A.
Case (iv): Now consider Figure B.3 which is defined in the same way as Fig-
ure A.1. Points A, B, G andH are characterized in the same way. From the proof
in case (i), we know that point A is below point B and point G is above point H.
Since c bB > bˆ⇤S by assumption, from the proof in case (ii), we have point G is
above point A and point A is above point H. Also, projecting point A onto curve






































. Since c  p⇤B  bS by
assumption, we have point C is below or on the line bˆS = bS. Also, from the




S (c  p⇤B)> c bB (p⇤B) = bˆ1S (p⇤B).
Thus, we have pointC is above point B in Figure B.3.
B.4 Solutions with linear quasi-demands
Assume bB and bS follow a uniform distribution so quasi-demands are linear.
We allow for the full range of a .
In the case of perfect price discrimination, the solutions are:





B (bS) = c bS
































































































































































































































Throughout the paper we assumed that all buyers were ex-ante identical and
only differed at the point of sale in terms of their draw of convenience bene-
fits of using cards. Hence, the issuer’s two-part tariff allowed it to fully extract
buyers’ surplus for a given seller type. However, the conclusions in Proposi-
tions 1.1-1.4 will continue to hold even if some buyers know their convenience
benefit of using cards prior to choosing a seller to buy from or indeed prior to
choosing whether to hold a payment card, provided we allow the platform to
discriminate across such buyers and the assumption in (1.3) still holds. In par-
ticular, we assume the issuer can set a different fixed fee to extract the different
surplus of each different type of buyer. Thus, we continue to assume full price
discrimination possibilities on both sides.
Consider the following modified timing:
• Stage 1: One or more interchange fees are set (either by a planner or the
platform).
• Stage 2: A monopoly issuer sets its per transaction fee(s) and fixed fees
for buyers, and competing acquirers set their merchant fees.
• Stage 3: Some buyers draw their convenience benefits. Without observing
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the fees faced by the other side, buyers decide whether to hold cards and
sellers decide whether to accept cards. Sellers set their prices.
• Stage 4: All buyers observe which sellers accept cards and their prices.
Some buyers draw their convenience benefit and and choose a seller to go
to in each subsector knowing this. For the remaining buyers, they observe
their convenience benefit of using cards only after they have chosen a
seller to buy from (i.e. at the point of check-out). Finally, all buyers
decide whether to use card or cash for the purchase (or not to purchase at
all).
It is straightforward to show the usual merchant internalization condition
holds in such a setting with a standard Hotelling model of seller competition.
All buyers with bB   pB will hold and use cards. Thus, the expected surplus the
seller delivers to its buyers from accepting cards is still avB (pB)DB (pB), and
the proof of the merchant internalization still applies.
The ability to price discriminate implies the platform can set a different in-
terchange fee for each different type of seller to extract maximal surplus. Con-
sider first the case with almost perfect price discrimination. The interchange
fee schedule will be set as in (A.16). For the optimal per transaction fee p⇤B set
by the issuer, the fixed fee F will be equal to the resulting surplus buyers ex-
pect to get from using cards given each buyer faces the same retail price in each
subsector regardless of how they pay.
From the timing of the model, we can assume there exists 0 < g  1 such
that g buyers draw their convenience benefit before they choose whether to hold
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cards or not and 1 g buyers draw their convenience benefit after they made the
decision. Whether buyers draw their convenience benefit before or after they
choose whether to hold cards, they will pay by card if bB   p⇤B. For g buyers
who draw their convenience benefit before they choose whether to hold cards,
given the issuer can directly price discriminate, it will set the fixed fee schedule
F (bB) = bB  pB for the buyer with convenience benefit bB, and set the fixed fee




for those buyers who draw their convenience
benefit after they choose whether to hold cards. Thus the surplus the issuer
could extract from fixed fees is:









(bB  p⇤B) dHB (bB)





This implies the issuer’s profit remains the same as in Section 1.4. The same
logic implies the issuer’s profit remains the same in the case of a single inter-
change fee. As a result, Propositions 1.3 and Proposition 1.4 still hold.
For the perfect price discrimination case, given the issuer can directly price




(bB  pB (bS)) dHS (bS) for the buyer with convenience benefit bB,





(bB  pB (bS)) dHB (bB)dHS (bS) for
those buyers who draw their convenience benefit after they choose whether to
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hold cards. Thus, the surplus the issuer can extract through fixed fees is:

















(bB  pB (bS)) dHB (bB)dHS (bS) .
This implies the issuer’s profit function will remain the same as in Section 1.3
and Proposition 1.1 still holds.
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Appendix C
Appendix of Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 2.1
Proof. This is a generalization of Rochet and Tirole (2002) which assumes that
all consumers hold cards and draw their convenience benefit bB before going
to the stores. In our settings, even though k consumers hold cards, 0 < f < 1
of them draw their convenience benefit before going to the stores and the rest
1  f of them draw their convenience benefit at the point of sale. Facing the
same retail price regardless of whether they pay by cash or card, they will pay
by card when bB   pB. So for given market shares, merchants’ net benefit from
a card transaction is k (bS  pS)DB (pB).
(1) We adopt the timing assumption in Rochet and Tirole (2002) that mer-
chants make card acceptance choices first then choose retail prices. In Hotelling
model, if both merchants accept cards, they set the same retail price p⇤ =
d+ kDB (pB)(pS bS)+ t and obtain the same profit p⇤ = t2 . If one of them





p j  pi bB+ pB
2t
.
Thus aggregating over k consumers (in which f consumers draw the conve-
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nience benefit before going to the stores and 1 f consumers draw the conve-






p j  pi kDB (pB)vB (pB)
2t
. (C.1)
Merchant i chooses pi to maximize the profit below
pi = (pi d)xi





p j+ t+d kDB (bB)vB (pB)
 
. (C.2)
Merchant j’s market share of cardholders has changed, thus its profit function
becomes

























(pi+ t+d+kDB (bB)(vB (pB)+ pS bS)) . (C.4)
Thus from (C.2) and (C.4), we have the following equilibrium prices
pi = t+d  13kDB (bB)(vB (pB)  pS+bS) , (C.5)
p j = t+d+
1
3
kDB (bB)(vB (pB)+2pS 2bS) . (C.6)




























kDB (pB)(vB (pB)  pS+bS)
◆2
  (pS bS)vB (pB)kDB (pB)(1 kDB (pB)) . (C.10)
Comparing (C.9) with p⇤ = p/2, we can see that the deviation decreases mer-
chant i’s profit if bS+vB (pB)  pS. Since bS+µvB (pB)  pS, 0 µ  1 implies
bS+vB (pB)  pS, there is an equilibrium in which both merchants accept cards
if bS + µvB (pB)   pS for 0  µ  1. Note that since t is sufficiently large,
merchant i’s market share (C.7) is positive when bS+µvB (pB)  pS.
(2) Alternative timing assumption: For each merchant, card acceptance pol-
icy and retail price are chosen simultaneously. If both merchants accept cards,
they set the same retail price p⇤ = d+ kDB (pB)(pS bS) + t and obtain the
same profit p⇤ = t2 . If merchant i deviates to reject cards, its market share is
given by (C.1) and the optimal price is given by (C.2). Merchant j’s price re-
mains the same, thus merchants’ prices are
pi = d+ t+
kDB (pB)(pS bS  vB (pB))
2
,
p j = d+ t+kDB (pB)(pS bS) .





















kDB (pB)(pS bS  vB (pB))
◆2
, (C.12)
2tp j = t2+kDB (pB)(bS  pS)(t+ vB (pB)(1 kDB (pB))) .
Comparing (C.12) with p⇤ = p/2, we can see that the deviation decreases mer-
chant i’s profit if bS + vB (pB)   pS. Since bS +wvB (pB)   pS, 0  w  1
implies bS+ vB (pB)   pS, there is an equilibrium in which both merchants ac-
cept cards if bS+wvB (pB)  pS for 0 w  1. Note that since t is sufficiently
large, merchant i’s market share (C.11) is positive when bS+wvB (pB)  pS.
Proof of Corollary 2.1
Proof. This is a generalization of Rochet and Tirole (2011) which assumes
that consumers draw their convenience benefit bB at the point of sale. In our
settings, we assume that f of the consumers draw their convenience benefit be-
fore they choose which merchant to go to and the rest 1  f of the consumers
draw their convenience benefit after they arrive at the merchants’ stores. For k
consumers who hold cards, facing the same price whether they pay by cash
or card, no matter when they draw their convenience benefit, they will pay
by card when bB   pB, thus merchants’ net benefit from card transaction is
(bS  pS)kDB (pB). So merchant j’s profit function is:
p j = (p j d+ x j(pS bS)kDB(pB)))s j
in which s j represents the market share of merchant j, x j is equal to 1 if merchant
j accepts the card, and 0 if he does not, d is the cost of producing the good.
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Follow the proof of Rochet and Tirole (2011), since t is sufficiently large,
merchant j’s market share is positive when bS + vB(pB)   pS and we get an
equilibrium in which all merchants accept cards if bS+ vB(pB)  pS.
Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. Suppose there is an equilibrium in which all merchants accept cards and
the equilibrium prices of all merchants other than merchant j are denoted by the
vector p⇤  j. Merchant j chooses p j to maximize its profit function:
p j = (p j  c j  (pS bS)DB(pB))q j(p j, p⇤  j). (C.13)
Suppose instead merchant j deviates to reject cards. If consumers buy from
merchant j and pay by cash, their utility will be lowered by vB(pB)DB(pB),
which is equivalent to the price of merchant j being increased by vB(pB)DB(pB).
Then merchant j’s profit becomes:
p j = (p j  c j)q j(p j+ vB(pB)DB(pB), p⇤  j). (C.14)
Define p0j = p j+ vB(pB)DB(pB). Then (C.14) can be rewritten as:
p 0j = (p0j  c j  vB(pB)DB(pB))q j(p0j, p⇤  j). (C.15)
Comparing (C.15) with (C.13), it is clear that maxp0j p
0
j >maxp j p j if pS > bS+
vB(pB)DB(pB), maxp0j p
0
j <maxp j p j if pS< bS+vB(pB)DB(pB) and maxp0j p
0
j =
maxp j p j if pS = bS+ vB(pB)DB(pB). Thus there is an equilibrium in which all
merchants accept cards if and only if bS+ vB(pB)DB(pB)  pS.
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Proof of Proposition 2.3
Proof. The representative consumer’s utility function from purchasing goods is









From first order condition of utility maximization, we have
∂ f
∂q j
(q1,q2, ...,qn)+DB(pB)vB(pB)I j = p j, j = 1,2, ...,n. (C.16)
(i) If merchants compete in quantities, we define l j(q1,q2, ...,qn)= ∂ f∂q j (q1,q2, ...,qn),
j = 1,2, ...,n and merchant j’s profit is
p j = q j(l j(q1,q2, ...,qn)  c j  I jDB(pB)(pS bS  vB(pB))).
When bS + vB(pB)   pS, merchant j’s profit margin is increased if it accepts
cards. Thus we have an equilibrium in which all merchants accept cards if and
only if bS+ vB(pB)  pS.
(ii) If merchants compete in prices, denote p˜ j = p j DB(pB)vB(pB)I j, j =
1,2, ...,n, from (C.16), we could derive q j(p˜1, p˜2, ..., p˜n), then merchant j0s
profit is written as
p j = q j( p˜1, p˜2, ..., p˜n)( p˜ j  c j  I jDB(pB)(pS bS  vB(pB))).
When bS + vB(pB)   pS, merchant j’s profit margin is increased if it accepts
cards. Thus we have an equilibrium in which all merchants accept cards if and
only if bS+ vB(pB)  pS.
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Appendix D
Appendix of Chapter 3
Appendix I: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.3
We consider the case in which licensor stays in the market after licensing.
(i) Licensor licenses to some inefficient firms and no firm exits the market after
licensing.
Given kˇS, firms decide their bids independently and simultaneously based on
their expectation of the production profits. From first order condition of profit




1  c  ckˇS+ c˜kˇS+ cK  c˜K
K+1
, i 2 G (D.1)
qˇSj =
1 2c+ c˜  ckˇS+ c˜kˇS
K+1
, j /2 G (D.2)
PˇS =




c  c˜+K Kc+ kˇSc  kˇSc˜
K+1
(D.4)
Since inefficient firms are symmetric, in equilibrium they must have the same
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bid, i.e. bˇSi = bˇ
S. Thus firms’ payoffs are written as:
pˇS1 = (qˇS1)2+ kˇSbˇS (D.5)
pˇSi = (qˇSi )2  bˇS, i 2 G (D.6)
pˇSj = (qˇSj)2, j /2 G (D.7)
A licensee and a nonlicensee must have the same payoff in equilibrium, thus the
most a firm will bid for a license is





No nonlicensee will bid more than bˇS to become a licensee because its net profit
would decline. Similarly, a licensee would bid neither more than bˇS for a license,
nor less and become a nonlicensee. Thus, bˇS is each firm’s equilibrium bid.










(1 2c+ c˜  ckˇS+ c˜kˇS)2
(K+1)2
, i 6= 1. (D.10)
Go back to the beginning of the game, firm 1 chooses number of licensees, kˇS to




(c  c˜)(2K  c+ c˜ 4Kc+2Kc˜ 2ckˇS+2c˜kˇS+K2c K2c˜ 4KckˇS+4Kc˜kˇS)
(K+1)2
= 0
from which we have
kˇS =
(c  c˜)(K2 2K 1)+2K(1  c)
(4K+2)(c  c˜) . (D.11)
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Now we consider two cases, licensor does not license to all inefficient firms,
i.e. kˇ < K 1 or licenses to all inefficient firms, i.e. kˇ = K 1.
(1) kˇ < K 1.
Substituting kˇ back into (D.1), (D.2), (D.3), (D.4), (D.8), (D.9) and (D.10),









, i 2 G
qˇS,⇤j =
2(1  c)  (K+1)(c  c˜)
4K+2














, i 6= 1
Since a = c c˜1 c , we need the following condition to make sure qˇ
S,⇤
j > 0, thus no








Combine (3.1), (D.13) and (D.14), we have
2K





(2) kˇS   K 1 if the following condition holds.
0< a  2K
3K2 1 (D.16)
Thus we have kˇS,⇤ = K  1 since the number of licensees, kˇS can never exceed
K 1. Then knowing that all firms will be licensees, no firm will bid bˇS > 0 if
there isn’t any other restriction. Thus firm 1 has to announce that all firms will
be licensed the patent and state a reservation price slightly below the magnitude
bˇS,⇤1 below, the benefit to a firm if all are licensed, below which he will not sell
a license.
bˇS,⇤ =
(2  c  c˜+Kc˜ Kc)(c  c˜)
K+1
.
Substituting kˇS,⇤ back into (D.1), (D.2), (D.3), (D.4), (D.9) and (D.10), we have

















, i 6= 1.
Since qˇS,⇤i > 0 for 1 i K, no firm exits the market after licensing.
(ii) Licensor does not license to all inefficient firms and nonlicensees exit the
market after licensing.
We need (D.14) to make sure kˇS < K 1, i.e. licensor does not license to all
inefficient firms, and from (D.13), we have qˇSj  0, j /2G if a   2K+1 . Combining
these two conditions and (3.1), we have
2
K+1
 a < 1. (D.18)
1bˇS,⇤ is obtained by substituting kˇS,⇤ = K 1 into (D.8).
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From (D.2), we know that qˇSj  0 is equivalent to kˇS   1a  1, thus the minimum
of kˇS is kˇS = 1a   1 = 1 2c+c˜c c˜ . Since unlicensed firms exit the market after li-
censing, there are kˇS+ 1 firms with the same marginal cost c˜ remaining in the















Since inefficient firms are symmetric, in equilibrium they must have the same
bid which is denoted as bˇSi = bˇ
S, thus firms’ payoffs are written as:
pˇS1 = (qˇS1)2+ kˇSbˇS; pˇSi = (qˇSi )2  bˇS, i 2 G; pˇSj = 0, j /2 G, (D.21)
A licensee and a nonlicensee must have the same payoff in equilibrium, thus the
most a firm will bid for a license is









; pˇSi = 0, i 6= 1.
Go back to the beginning of the game, firm 1 chooses number of licensees, kˇS
to maximize its payoff. Since firm 1’s payoff is decreasing in kˇS, so firm 1 will
set kˇS to be its minimal possible value, thus we have kˇS,⇤ = 1 2c+c˜c c˜ . Substituting
kˇS,⇤ into (D.19), (D.20), (D.21) and (D.22), we have firms’ bids, outputs, market
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price, aggregate quantity and firms’ payoffs
bˇS,⇤ = (c  c˜)2; qˇS,⇤1 = qˇS,⇤i = c  c˜, i 2 G;
qˇS,⇤j = 0, j /2 G; PˇS,⇤ = c; QˇS,⇤ = 1  c;
pˇS,⇤1 = (1  c)(c  c˜); pˇS,⇤i = 0, i 6= 1. (D.23)
Proof of Lemma 3.4
We consider the case in which licensor exits the market after licensing.
(i) Licensor licenses to some inefficient firms and nonlicensees stay in the mar-
ket after licensing.
Given kˇE , firms decide their bids independently and simultaneously based on
their expectation of the production profits. From first order condition of profit
maximization, we work out firms’ outputs, market price and aggregate quantity:
qˇEi =
1  c  ckˇE + c˜kˇE + cK  c˜K
K
, i 2 G (D.24)
qˇEj =
1  c  ckˇE + c˜kˇE
K
, j /2 G (D.25)
PˇE =




(1+ kˇE  K)c+K 1  c˜kˇE
K
(D.27)
Since inefficient firms are symmetric, in equilibrium they must have the same
bid, i.e. bˇEi = bˇ
E . Thus firms’ payoffs are written as:
pˇE1 = kˇE bˇE (D.28)
pˇEi = (qˇEi )2  bˇE , i 2 G (D.29)
pˇEj = (qˇEj )2, j /2 G (D.30)
A licensee and a nonlicensee must have the same payoff in equilibrium, thus the
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most a firm will bid for a license is
bˇE = (qˇEi )
2  (qˇEj )2 =
(c  c˜)(2+2kˇE c˜ Kc˜+(K 2k˜E  2)c)
K2
.(D.31)
No nonlicensee will bid more than bˇE to become a licensee because its net profit
would decline. Similarly, a licensee would bid neither more than bˇE for a li-
cense, nor less and become a nonlicensee. Thus, bˇE is each firm’s equilibrium
bid. Substituting (D.24), (D.25) and (D.31) into (D.28) and (D.29), we have
firms’ payoffs
pˇE1 =




(1  c  ckˇE + c˜kˇE)2
K2
, i 6= 1. (D.33)
Go back to the beginning of the game, firm 1 chooses number of licensees, kˇE





(c  c˜)(2+4kˇE c˜ Kc˜+(K 4kˇE  2)c)
K2
= 0
from which we have
kˇE =
K(c  c˜)+2(1  c)
4(c  c˜) . (D.34)
Now we consider two cases, licensor does not license to all inefficient firms,
i.e. kˇE < K 1 or licenses to all inefficient firms, i.e. kˇE = K 1.
(1) kˇE < K 1.
Substituting kˇ back into (D.24), (D.25), (D.26), (D.27), (D.31), (D.32) and



























, i 6= 1
Since a = c c˜1 c , we need the following condition to make sure qˇ
E,⇤
j > 0, thus no








Combine (3.1), (D.36) and (D.37), we have
2




(2) kˇE   K 1 if the following condition holds.
0< a  2
3K 4 (D.39)
Thus we have kˇE,⇤ = K 1 since the number of licensees, kˇE can never exceed
K 1. Then knowing that all firms will be licensees, no firm will bid bˇE > 0 if
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there isn’t any other restriction. Thus firm 1 has to announce that all firms will
be licensed the patent and state a reservation price slightly below the magnitude






Substituting kˇE,⇤ back into (D.24), (D.25), (D.26), (D.27), (D.32) and (D.33),

















, i 6= 1.
Since qˇE,⇤i > 0 for 1 i K, no firm exits the market after licensing.
(ii) Licensor does not license to all inefficient firms and nonlicensees exit the
market after licensing.
We need (D.14) to make sure kˇE < K 1, i.e. licensor does not license to all
inefficient firms, and from (D.36), we have qˇEj  0, j /2 G if a   2K . Combining
these two conditions and (3.1), we have
2
K
 a < 1. (D.41)
From (D.2), we know that qˇEj  0 is equivalent to kˇE   1a , thus the minimum
of kˇE is kˇE = 1a =
1 c
c c˜ . Since unlicensed firms exit the market after licensing,
there are kˇE firms with the same marginal cost c˜ remaining in the market after
2bˇE,⇤ is obtained by substituting kˇE,⇤ = K 1 into (D.31).
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Since inefficient firms are symmetric, in equilibrium they must have the same
bid which is denoted as bˇSi = bˇ
S, thus firms’ payoffs are written as:
pˇE1 = kˇE bˇE ; pˇEi = (qˇEi )2  bˇE , i 2 G; pˇEj = 0, j /2 G, (D.44)
A licensee and a nonlicensee must have the same payoff in equilibrium, thus the
most a firm will bid for a license is









; pˇEi = 0, i 6= 1.
Go back to the beginning of the game, firm 1 chooses number of licensees, kˇE
to maximize its payoff. Since firm 1’s payoff is decreasing in kˇE , so firm 1 will
set kˇE to be its minimal possible value, thus we have kˇE,⇤ = 1 cc c˜ . Substituting
kˇE,⇤ into (D.42), (D.43), (D.44) and (D.45), we have firms’ bids, outputs, market
price, aggregate quantity and firms’ payoffs
bˇE,⇤ = (c  c˜)2; qˇE,⇤1 = qˇE,⇤i = c  c˜, i 2 G;
qˇE,⇤j = 0, j /2 G; PˇE,⇤ = c; QˇE,⇤ = 1  c;
pˇE,⇤1 = (1  c)(c  c˜); pˇE,⇤i = 0, i 6= 1. (D.46)
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Proof of Proposition 3.5
(1) When 0 < a  2K3K2 1 , whether licensor exits or stays in the market, it li-
censes to all inefficient firms and licensees stay in the market. Then we have3:
pˇS,⇤1   pˇE,⇤1 =
(1  c)(c  c˜)(K  (2K2 K 2)a)
K(K+1)2
which is positive when 0 < a < K2K2 K 2 and negative when
K
2K2 K 2 < a <
2K




1 when 0 < a <
K
2K2 K 2 and it is optimal for




2K2 K 2 < a <
2K
3K2 1
and it is optimal for licensor to exit the market.
(2) When 2K3K2 1 < a  23K 4 , if licensor exits the market, it licenses to all in-
efficient firms and licensees stay in the market after licensing. If licensor stays
in the market, it does not licenses to all inefficient firms and no firm exits the
market after licensing. Then we have4:
pˇS,⇤1   pˇE,⇤1 = ((9K3 18K2+5K+8)a2+( 12K2+8K+8)a+4K)
(1  c)2
K(8K+4)




1 and it is
optimal for licensor to exit the market after licensing.
(3) When 23K 4 < a <
2
K+1 , licensor does not license to all inefficient firms
and no firm exits the market after licensing, regardless whether licensor exits or
stays in the market. Then we have5
pˇS,⇤1   pˇE,⇤1 =
(1  c)2((3K2+2K)a2 4Ka 4)
2K(8K+4)
3pˇS,⇤1 is given by (D.17) and pˇ
E,⇤
1 is given by (D.40)
4pˇS,⇤1 is given by (D.12) and pˇ
E,⇤
1 is given by (D.40)
5pˇS,⇤1 is given by (D.12) and pˇ
E,⇤
1 is given by (D.35)
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which is negative when 23K 4 < a <
2




1 and it is
optimal for licensor to exit the market after licensing.
(4) When 2K+1 < a <
2
K , if licensor exits the market, it does not license to all
inefficient firms and no firm exits the market after licensing, if licensor stays in
the market, it does not license to all inefficient firms but nonlicensees exit the
market after licensing. Then we have6:




Since pˇS,⇤1 < pˇ
E,⇤
1 , it is optimal for licensor to exit the market after licensing.
(5) When 2K  a < 1, whether firm 1 exits or stays in the market, it does not
license to all inefficient firms and nonlicensees exit the market after licensing.
Then we have7:
pˇS,⇤1   pˇE,⇤1 = 0,
thus licensor is indifferent between exiting and staying in the market.
Proof of Proposition 3.1
(i) When (D.16) holds, licensor licenses to all inefficient firms and all firms stay
in the market, thus we have
DW = (K 1)(c  c˜)(2K
2+3K+1)(c  c˜) 2K(1  c)
2(K+1)2
which is negative given (D.16).
(ii) When (D.15) holds, licensor does not license to all inefficient firms and
6pˇS,⇤1 is given by (D.23) and pˇ
E,⇤
1 is given by (D.35)
7pˇS,⇤1 is given by (D.23) and pˇ
E,⇤
1 is given by (D.46)
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nonlicensees stay in the market after licensing. Then we have
DW =  f (K,c, c˜)g(K,c, c˜)
8(2K+1)(K+1)2
in which f (K,c, c˜) = (K2 2K 1)(c  c˜)+2K(1 c)> 0, g(K,c, c˜) = 2K(1 
c)  (K2+ 6K+ 3)(c  c˜). So we have DW = 0 when a = 2KK2+6K+3 , DW < 0
when 2K3K2 1 < a <
2K
K2+6K+3 and DW > 0 when
2K
K2+6K+3 < a <
2
K+1 .
(iii) When (D.18) holds, licensor does not license to all inefficient firms and
nonlicensees exit the market after licensing. Then we have
DW = (1  c  (c  c˜))(1  c˜+2K(c  c˜))
2(K+1)2
which is positive given (D.18).
Proof of Proposition 3.2
(i) When (D.39) holds, licensor licenses to all inefficient firms and nonlicensees
stay in the market after licensing. Then we have
DW = h(K,c, c˜)m(K,c, c˜)
2K2(K+1)2
in which h(K,c, c˜) = ((K2 K 1)(c  c˜)  (1  c)) is negative when 0< a <
1
K2 K 1 and positive when
1
K2 K 1 < a <
2
3K 4 , m(K,c, c˜) = ((2K
3+ 3K2 
K 1)(c  c˜)  (2K2+2K+1)(1  c)) is negative given (D.39). Thus we have
DW > 0 when 0< a < 1K2 K 1 and DW < 0 when
1
K2 K 1 < a <
2
3K 4 .
(ii) When (D.38) holds, licensor does not license to all inefficient firms and
nonlicensees stay in the market, thus we have
DW = l(K,c, c˜)((4K




in which l(K,c, c˜) = ((2  2K)(1  c)  (K2  3K)(c  c˜)) < 0. Thus we have
DW = 0 when a = 4K2+2K+22K3+11K2+5K , DW > 0 when
4K2+2K+2
2K3+11K2+5K < a <
2
K and
DW < 0 when 23K 4 < a <
4K2+2K+2
2K3+11K2+5K .
(iii) When (D.41) holds, licensor does not license to all inefficient firms and
nonlicensees exit the market, thus we have
DW = (1  c  (c  c˜))(1  c+2K(c  c˜))
2(K+1)2
which is positive given (D.41).
Proof of Proposition 3.5
When licensing is based on royalty, we compare licensor’s profits when it exits
or stays in the market:
pˇE1   pˇS1 =
1
K(K+1)2
(K(1  c)+ c  c˜)(c 1 K(c  c˜))< 0,
thus we have pˇE1 < pˇS1 and it is optimal for licensor to stay in the market.
When licensor exits the market, we have
DW = 1
2K2(K+1)2
(K(c  c1)+1  c)(K(2(1  c)  (c  c1))+2K2(1+ c1 2c)+1  c)
which is positive from (3.1), thus licensing after patent competition is welfare
improving.
When licensor stays in the market, since firms’ outputs and licensees’ pay-
offs remain the same after licensing, we have DW = 0 and licensing leads to no
change in social welfare.
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Appendix II: Licensing with Fixed Fee
In this section, we consider licensing with fixed fee which differs from licensing
auction that the licensor sets a price at which any firm wishing to can buy a
license, the price is set as the most a firm will bid for a license in an auction
game except that when determing how much to bid for a license in the game, a
potential buyer, while comparing his profits as a licensee versus a nonlicensee,
knows that if he does not purchase a license, there will be one fewer licensee.
We adopt the assumptions of licensing auction case and analyze firms’ outputs,
market price, firms’ profits after licensing when licensor exits or stays in the
market and license to different numbers of firms. We begin the analysis by
assuming that licensor stays in the market.
A. Licensor stays in the market
We consider the case in which licensor stays in the market after licensing.
Case (i) Licensor licenses to some inefficient firms and no firm exits the
market after licensing. Given the number of licensees, kˇS  K   1 and fixed
licensing fee FˇS, from first order condition of profit maximization, we work out




((kˇS)2 K  kˇSK+2kˇS+1)c+( (kˇS)2  kˇS+K+ kˇSK)c⇤   kˇS 1
 (K+1)(kˇS+1) , i 2 S
qˇSj =
(kˇS+1)c  kˇSc⇤  1








Thus firms payoffs are written as:
pˇS1 = (qˇS1)2+ kˇSFˇS
pˇSi = (qˇSi )2  FˇS, i 2 S
pˇSj = (qˇSj)2, j /2 S
A licensee and a nonlicensee must have the same payoff in equilibrium, thus the
licensing fee must be
FˇS = (qˇSi )
2  (qˇSj)2 =








(kˇS  c(2kˇS K KkˇS+(kˇS)2+1)  c⇤(K  kˇS+KkˇS  (kˇS)2)+1)2
(K+1)2(kˇS+1)2
Go back to the beginning of the game, licensor chooses kˇS to maximize its ex-




Now we consider two cases, licensor does not license to all inefficient firms,
i.e. kˇS < K 1 or licenses to all inefficent firms, i.e. kˇS = K 1.
(1) kˇS < K 1,










2(2K2+K 1) , i 2 S
qˇS,⇤j =
K(2 2c⇤  Kc+Kc⇤)















(4K2+2K 2)2 , i 6= 1



























if K  4.
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which is negative given (D.49). Thus DW is decreasing in c⇤ for K and c which
satisfy (D.49). We provide some numerical examples below (Table D.1, D.2).
K c c⇤ DW
10 0.3 0.126 0.0801
10 0.3 0.16 0.0554
10 0.3 0.21 0.0221
10 0.3 0.23 0.0097
10 0.3 0.251 -0.0027
Table D.1: Numerical Example





In this case, licensor licenses to all inefficient firms, i.e. kˇS,⇤ = K  1. Then
knowing that all firms will be licensees, no firm will pay FˇS > 0 if there isn’t
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K c c⇤ DW
15 0.3 0.2 0.0407
15 0.3 0.21 0.0336
15 0.3 0.23 0.0200
15 0.3 0.245 0.0104
15 0.3 0.26 0.0012
Table D.2: Numerical Example
any other restriction. Thus firm 1 has to announce that K  1 will be licensees
and state a reservation price slightly below the magnitude FˇS,⇤ below, the benefit
to a firm if all are licensed, below which he will not sell a license.
FˇS,⇤ =






















, i 6= 1
Since qˇS,⇤i > 0 for 1 i K, we know that no firm exits the market after licens-
ing. Then we have
















(c  c⇤)((3K K2)(1  c)+(K3 3K2  1
2
)(c  c⇤))






(3K K2)(1  c)+(K3 3K2  12)(c  c⇤)< 0, thus DW < 0.
(ii) Licensor does not license to all inefficient firms and nonlicensees exit
the market after licensing. Then we need the following condition to make sure
qˇ j  0.
a  kˇS (D.52)






,K > 4 (D.53)
and qˇ j > 0 when K  4. We can work out firms’ outputs, market price and






, i 2 S







For the fixed licensing fee set by licensor, FˇS, firms’ payoffs are
pˇS1 = (qˇS1)2+ kˇSFˇS
pˇSi = (qˇSi )2  FˇS, i 2 S
pˇSj = 0, j /2 S
thus fixed fee must be









pˇSi = 0, i 6= 1
Go back to the beginning of the game, firm 1 chooses kˇS to maximize its profit.
We can see that firm 1’s profit is decreasing in kˇS, so firm 1 will set kˇS to be its
minimal possible value. Since nonlicensees exit only when K > 4 and K 1>
K 2













, i 2 S










pˇS,⇤i = 0, i 6= 1
Since QˇS,⇤ < Q¯, pˇS,⇤i < p¯i, we must have DW < 0.
B. Licensor exits the market
We consider the case in which licensor exits the market after licensing. (i) Li-
censor licenses to some inefficient firms and nonlicensees stay in the market
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after licensing. Given the number of licensees, kˇE  K  1 and fixed licensing
fee FˇE . From first order condition of profit maximization, we work out firms
outputs, market price and aggregate quantity:
qˇEi =
1  c+(K  kˇE)(c  c⇤)
K
, i 2 S
qˇEj =
1  c+(1  kˇE)(c  c⇤)
K
, j /2 S






Thus firms’ payoffs are
pˇE1 = kˇEFˇE
pˇEi = (qˇEi )2  FˇE , i 2 S
pˇEj = (qˇEj )2, j /2 S
thus the licensing fee must be set as
FˇE = (qˇEi )
2  (qˇEj )2 =
(c  c⇤)(K 1)(2  c  c⇤+Kc Kc⇤  2ckˇE +2c⇤kˇE)
K2
so we have
pˇE1 = kˇEFˇE =
kˇE(c  c⇤)(K 1)(2  c  c⇤+Kc Kc⇤  2ckˇE +2c⇤kˇE)
K2
Go back to the beginning of the game, firm 1 chooses kˇE to maximize its payoff.




(1) kˇE < K 1
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In this case, we have
FˇE,⇤ =























We need the following condition to make sure qˇE,⇤j > 0, thus nonlicensees stay





























if K  5.
158
In this case, we have










(2+ c 3c⇤   cK+ c⇤K)2
16K2
).






+ 2cK4+4c1K4  cK5+ c1K5.





which is negative given (D.56). Thus DW is decreasing in c⇤ for K and c which
satisfy (D.56). We provide some numerical examples below (Table D.3, D.4).
K c c⇤ DW
10 0.5 0.360 0.0460
10 0.5 0.380 0.0356
10 0.5 0.400 0.0257
10 0.5 0.430 0.0117
10 0.5 0.459 -0.0007
Table D.3: Numerical Example






In this case, licensor licenses to all inefficient firms, i.e. kˇE,⇤ = K  1. Then
knowing that all firms will be licensees, no firm will pay FˇE > 0 if there isn’t
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K c c⇤ DW
15 0.3 0.19 0.0455
15 0.3 0.21 0.0314
15 0.3 0.23 0.0181
15 0.3 0.24 0.0117
15 0.3 0.26 -0.0005
Table D.4: Numerical Example
any other restriction. Thus firm 1 has to announce that K  1 will be licensees
and state a reservation price slightly below the magnitude FˇE,⇤ below, the benefit





















, i 6= 1
Since qˇE,⇤i > 0 for 2 iK, we know that all licensees stay in the market. Then
we have










(1+ c+ c⇤(K 2)  cK)2
K2
)
in which (1+ c+ c⇤(K 2)  cK)2  (1 2c+ c⇤)2 = (2(1  c)  (K 1)(c 





0. Also we have (1  c⇤)2(K  1)2  (c⇤+ c(K  1) K)2 = ((2  c  c⇤)K 
(1 c))(2c⇤ 1 c)< 0 from which we get (1 c⇤)2(K 1)22K2  
(c⇤+c(K 1) K)2
2(1+K)2 < 0.
So we must have DW < 0.
(ii) Licensor does not license to all inefficient firms and nonlicensees exit
the market after licensing. We have qˇEj  0 if
a  kˇ 1 (D.59)






,K > 5 (D.60)





, i 2 S







Given the fixed licensing fee FˇE , firms’ payoffs are written as
pˇE1 = kˇEFˇE
pˇEi = (qˇEi )2  FˇE , i 2 S
pˇEj = 0, j /2 S
thus fixed fee must be









pˇEi = 0, i 6= 1
Go back to the beginning of the game, licensor chooses kˇE to maximize its ex-
pected payoff. We can see that licensor’s payoff is decreasing in kˇE , so licensor
will set kˇE to be its minimal possible value. Since nonlicensees exit only when











, i 2 S










pˇE,⇤i = 0, i 6= 1
Since QˇE,⇤ < Q¯, pˇE,⇤i < p¯i, we must have DW < 0.
C. Licensor’s choice
(1) When 1< 1 cc c⇤  K 32 , K > 5, licensor licenses to less than K 1 firms and
nonlicensees exit the market after licensing regardless of whether licensor exits
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or stays in the market. Licensor gets the same payoff in these two situations.
(2) When K 32 <
1 c
c c⇤  K 22 , K > 5, licensor licenses to less than K  1
firms and nonlicensees exit the market after licensing if licensor stays in the
market, licensor licenses to less than K 1 firms and nonlicensees remain in the
market after licensing if licensor exits the market. We have
pˇS,⇤1   pˇE,⇤1 =
1
8K2
[(2  c  c⇤)2+( 2+3c  c⇤)(2  c  c⇤)K
+ (c  c⇤)( 2+3c  c⇤)K2  (c  c⇤)2K3]< 0
thus licensor exits the market after licensing.
(3) When K 22 <
1 c
c c⇤  3K 52 , K > 5, licensor licenses to less than K  
1 firms and nonlicensees remain in the market after licensing regardless of




2K2(4K2+2K 2)2 [ (2(1  c)+(c  c
⇤))2+(2(1  c)  (c  c⇤))
⇤ (2(1  c)+(c  c⇤))K+4((1  c)+(c  c⇤))(3(1  c)+(c  c⇤))K2
  2(2+3c2+2c( 4+ c⇤)+(4 3c⇤)c⇤)K3
  (c  c⇤)(4(1  c)+(c  c⇤))K4+3(c  c⇤)2K5]
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Take partial derivative of pˇS,⇤1   pˇE,⇤1 with respect to c⇤, we have
4K2( 1+K+2K2)( 2+2K+4K2)2∂ (pˇ
S,⇤






denote x= 1  c, y= c  c⇤, we could rewrite the formula above as
4K2( 1+K+2K2)( 2+2K+4K2)2∂ (pˇ
S,⇤




which is negative given K 22 <
1 c
c c⇤  3K 52 , K > 5. Thus pˇS,⇤1   pˇE,⇤1 is de-
creasing in c⇤ for K and c which satisfy K 22 <
1 c
c c⇤  3K 52 , K > 5. We provide
some numerical examples below (Table D.5, D.6).
K c c⇤ Dp
10 0.5 0.38 0.00095
10 0.5 0.39 0.00067
10 0.5 0.41 0.00019
10 0.5 0.43 -0.00016
10 0.5 0.45 -0.00039
Table D.5: Numerical Example




2K 2 , K > 5, licensor licenses to less than
K   1 firms and nonlicensees remain in the market after licensing if licensor
stays in the market, licensor licenses to all inefficient firms if it exits the market.
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K c c⇤ Dp
15 0.3 0.2 0.00039
15 0.3 0.21 0.00016
15 0.3 0.23 -0.00020
15 0.3 0.24 -0.00033
15 0.3 0.25 -0.00042






⇤)+ c  c⇤)(c  c⇤) 4(4(1  c⇤)
+ 3(c  c⇤))(c  c⇤)K 16(c  c⇤)(1  c⇤)K2+8(4(1  c⇤)
+ 3(c  c⇤))(c  c⇤)K3 4( 1+3c2+ c⇤(3+ c⇤)  c(1+5c⇤))K4
  12(1  c⇤+ c  c⇤)(c  c⇤)K5+9(c  c⇤)2K6)
in which  12(1 c⇤+c c⇤)(c c⇤)K5+9(c c⇤)2K6 = (c c⇤)K5[ 12(1 
c⇤+c c⇤)+9K(c c⇤), from 1 cc c⇤ > 3K 52 , we have (1 c)> (1.5K 2.5)(c 
c⇤)which implies 6(1 c)+15(c c⇤)> 9K(c c⇤), since 12(1 c+c c⇤)>
6(1  c)+ 15(c  c⇤), we have 12(1  c⇤) > 9K(c  c⇤) which implies 12(1 
c⇤+c c⇤)> 9K(c c⇤), thus we have 12(1 c⇤+c c⇤)(c c⇤)K5+9(c 
c⇤)2K6 < 0. We must have pˇS,⇤1   pˇE,⇤1 < 0, licensor will exit the market.
(5) When 1 cc c⇤ >
3K2 4K+2
2K 2 , K > 5, licensor licenses to all inefficient firms





( (c  c⇤)(2(1  c)+3(c  c⇤))+(c  c⇤)2K
+ (1+2c(2+ c) 6c⇤  8cc⇤+7(c⇤)2)K2 2(1  c⇤+ c  c⇤)(c  c⇤)K3)
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Take partial derivative of pˇS,⇤1   pˇE,⇤1 with respect to c⇤, we have
K2(1+K)2
(pˇS,⇤1   pˇE,⇤1 )
∂c⇤
= 2+4c 6c⇤  2cK+2c⇤K 6K2 8cK2+14c⇤K2+2K3+6cK3 8c⇤K3
denote x= 1  c, y= c  c⇤, we could rewrite the formula above as
K2(1+K)2
(pˇS,⇤1   pˇE,⇤1 )
∂c⇤
= (2 6K2+2K3)x+(6 2K 14K2+8K3)y
which is positive given 1 cc c⇤ >
3K2 4K+2
2K 2 , K > 5. Thus pˇ
S,⇤
1   pˇE,⇤1 is increasing
in c⇤ for K and c which satisfy 1 cc c⇤ >
3K2 4K+2
2K 2 , K > 5. We provide some
numerical examples below (Table D.7, D.8).
K c c⇤ Dp
10 0.5 0.466 -0.00022
10 0.5 0.48 0.00080
10 0.5 0.49 0.00146
Table D.7: Numerical Example
K c c⇤ Dp
15 0.3 0.27 -0.00024
15 0.3 0.28 0.00052
15 0.3 0.49 0.00124
Table D.8: Numerical Example
We summarize licensor’s equilibrium choice of production below:
Proposition D.1. Licensor could exit or stay in the market after licensing,
• When 1< 1 cc c⇤  K 32 , K > 5, licensor either exits or stays in the market.
• When K 32 < 1 cc c⇤  K 22 , K > 5, licensor exits the market.
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• When K 22 < 1 cc c⇤  3K 52 , K > 5, keeping K and c constant, licensor exits
the market when c⇤ is close to c and stays in the market otherwise.
• When 3K 52 < 1 cc c⇤  3K
2 4K+2
2K 2 , K > 5, licensor exits the market.
• When 1 cc c⇤ > 3K
2 4K+2
2K 2 , K > 5, keeping K and c constant, licensor stays
in the market when c⇤ is close to c and exits the market otherwise.
It is hard to obtain a full result of the influence of licensing with fixed fee on
social welfare because the characterization of the licensor’s equilibrium choice
of production is complicated. We summarize the result of social welfare below:
Proposition D.2. If licensor stays in the market, we have
• When K 22 < 1 cc c⇤  3K
2 4K+2
2K 2 , K > 4, licensing reduces social welfare
when c⇤ is close to c and increases social welfare otherwise.
• When 1 cc c⇤   3K
2 4K+2
2K 2 , licensing reduces social welfare.
• When 1< 1 cc c⇤  K 22 , K > 4, licensing reduces social welfare.
Proposition D.3. If licensor exits the market, we have
• When K 32 < 1 cc c⇤  3K 52 , K > 5, licensing reduces social welfare when
c⇤ is close to c and increases social welfare otherwise.
• When 1 cc c⇤   3K 52 , licensing reduces social welfare.
• When 1< 1 cc c⇤  K 32 , licensing reduces social welfare.
Although it is hard to get general result of social welfare, from Proposition
D.2 and D.3, we can see that licensing with fixed fee in general reduces social
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welfare. The only cases that licensing improves social welfare are when licensor




2K 2 , K > 4 and c
⇤ is close to c or when
licensor exits the market, K 32 <
1 c
c c⇤  3K 52 , K > 5 and c⇤ is close to c.
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Appendix E
Appendix of Chapter 4
A. Proofs of Section 4.2
Trend of Royalty
From (4.2), we can get the result below.
Lemma E.1. For licensing with royalty, as the efficiency of licensees decrease,
(1) If r2 < c2  c1, royalty of licensee decreases as licensee becomes more
inefficient (i.e. as ci increases).
(2) If r j 1 = c j 1 c1 and r j < c j c1 for some j<K, royalty first increases
then decreases as licensee becomes more inefficient.
(3) If rK = cK  c1, royalty increases as licensee becomes more inefficient.
Proof. Suppose firm 1 licenses its technology to firm j or firm l and c j < cl .
We know that for any j   2, r j = min{c j  c1,  (K+3)(1 Kc1+Âk 6= j ck)2 2K2 2K }.
(1) If c2 c1   (K+3)(1 Kc1+Âk 6=2 ck)2 2K2 2K , then if firm 1 licenses its technology to
firm 2, r2=
 (K+3)(1 Kc1+Âk 6=2 ck)
2 2K2 2K . As c j c1 is increasing in c j,
 (K+3)(1 Kc1+Âk 6= j ck)
2 2K2 2K
is decreasing in c j, thus for any j   2, we have c j  c1    (K+3)(1 Kc1+Âk 6= j ck)2 2K2 2K
and r j =
 (K+3)(1 Kc1+Âk 6= j ck)









For K   1, we have   K+32 2K2 2K > 0, and since c j < cl , we have Âk 6= j ck >
Âk 6=l ck, so we have r j > rl .
(2) If c j 1 c1<  (K+3)(1 Kc1+Âk 6= j 1 ck)2 2K2 2K and c j c1 
 (K+3)(1 Kc1+Âk 6= j ck)
2 2K2 2K ,
then r j 1 = c j 1  c1 and for any i < j  1, we have  (K+3)(1 Kc1+Âk 6=i ck)2 2K2 2K >
ci  c1, thus ri = ci  c1 for any i< j 1 and ri =  (K+3)(1 Kc1+Âk 6=i ck)2 2K2 2K for any
i  j. So as the efficiency of licensees decrease, royalties will first increase then
decrease.
(3) If cK c1<  (K+3)(1 Kc1+Âk 6=K ck)2 2K2 2K , then ri= ci c1 for any i2 {1,2, ...,K}.
So royalty is increasing as the efficiency of licensee decreases.
The figures below show these three different possible trends of royalty as the







Royalties depend on the marginal costs of firms. If the royalty which is
worked out by using subgame perfect equilibrium is lower than the difference
between licensee and licensor’s marginal costs, licensor will set royalty to be
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equal to the equilibrium outcome, if the royalty which is worked out using sub-
game perfect equilibrium exceeds the difference between licensee and licensor’s
marginal costs, licensor will set royalty to be equal to the difference between li-
censee and licensor’s marginal costs.
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. Suppose firm 1 licenses its technology to firm i.
(A) If ri =
 (K+3)(1 Kc1+Âk 6=i ck)
2 2K2 2K , according to the optimal output of firm 1,













(1+Âk 6=1,i ck+ c2)2
(K+1)2
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(1) For K   4, since c2  ...  ci  ...  cK and the coefficient of positive
term far exceeds the coefficient of negative term, we have pR1  p1 > 0.
(2) For K = 3
















in which i= 2, j= 3 if firm 2 is the licensee, i= 3, j= 2 if firm 3 is the licensee.
(3) For K = 2








Thus, when number of firms in the market is small,(e.g K = 2,3), whether licen-
sor’s profit increase or decrease after licensing depends on the specific marginal
costs of firms, when number of firms in the market is large (K   4), licensor’s
profit will incease after licensing. After licensing, licensee’s profit can be writ-
ten as:
pRi = (1 Q  c1)qi+ riqi
= (1 Q  (c1  ri))qi
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Since ri < ci c1, it’s equivalent to a problem in which firm i chooses its output
to maximize its profit when marginal cost is lower. Also, from firms’ optimal
output derived, we know that after licensing, firms choose lower output. So firm
i’s profit margin increases after licensing. With the pre-licensing output, firm i
has a higher profit, and it could get an even higher profit by choosing the new
optimal output. So we know that profit of licensee increases after licensing with
royalty. So joint profit of licensor and licensee increases after licensing with
royalty when K   4. When K  4, it is ambiguous.
(B) If ri = ci c1, for licensee, it is equivalent to a problem in which nothing
changes about its marginal cost, so it chooses the pre-licensing output, in the
mean time, licensor also chooses the pre-licensing output, so after licensing,
licensor will get its pre-licensing profit as well as the revenue from licensing
fee, licensor’s profit after licensing must increase. So joint profit of licensor and
licensee increases after licensing.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
(1) If c2 c1   (K+3)(1 Kc1+Âk 6=2 ck)2 2K2 2K , differentiate ABC(pR1 +pRi  p1 pi)with












When ci is sufficiently small, d (ci) is positive, when ci approaches 1, d (ci) is
negative. Also, d (ci) is strictly decreasing in ci. So we have that as the effi-
ciency of licensee decreases, joint profit of licensor and licensee first increases
then decreases and there is a unique joint profit maximizing licensee, it should
be neither the least efficient firm nor the most efficient firm, but some firm in
between.
(2) If cK c1 <  (K+3)(1 Kc1+Âk 6=K ck)2 2K2 2K , then ri = ci c1 for any i2 1,2, ...,K.
We’ve already showed that all firms will choose its pre-licensing output, so joint
profit maximizing licensee should be the one which yields the maximal riqi.
riqi = (ci  c1)
(1+Â j2{1,...,K}\{i} c j Kci)
(K+1)





1+Â j2{1,...,K}\{i} c j+Kc1 2Kci
K+1
For givenK, when s(ci)= 0, we have joint profit maximizing licensee’s marginal
cost below:
0< ci =
1+Â j2{1,...,K}\{i} c j+Kc1
2K
< 1
When ci is sufficiently small, s(ci) is positive, when ci approaches 1, s(ci) is
negative. Also, s(ci) is strictly decreasing in ci. So we have that as the effi-
ciency of licensee decreases, joint profit of licensor and licensee first increases
then decreases and there is a unique joint profit maximizing licensee, it should
be neither the least efficient firm nor the most efficient firm, but some firm in
between.
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(3) If c j 1 c1<  (K+3)(1 Kc1+Âk 6= j 1 ck)2 2K2 2K and c j c1 
 (K+3)(1 Kc1+Âk 6= j ck)
2 2K2 2K
for some j, thus ri = ci  c1 for any i < j  1 and ri =  (K + 3)(1 Kc1 +
Âk 6=i ck)/(2 2K2 2K) for any i  j. Then if firm 1 licenses to a firm among
firm 2,...,firm j-1, using the method showed in (2), we can find a joint profit
maximizing licensee among those j 2 firms, if firm 1 licenses to a firm among
firm j,..., firm K, using the method showed in (1), we can find a joint profit
maximizing licensee among those K  j+1 firms, then we have to compare the
joint profit of these two local optimal choices and choose the licensee which
yields the larger joint profit.
Proof of Proposition 4.3




K firms produce in the market, we have P> cK . After licensing with fixed fee,
we have PF =
1+Âk 6=i ck+c1
K+1 , since no firm exits the market after licensing, we
have PF > cK . After licensing with royalty, since ri = ci c1, each firm chooses
its pre-licensing production level, market price PR =P. So we just need PF > cK
to guarantee that no firm exits the market after licensing with fixed fee as well
as licensing with royalty. From PF > cK we have
1+X+2c1 > (K+1)cK






























thus we have pFJ  pRJ > 0, licensing with fixed fee yields higher joint profit of
licensor and licensee.
(2)When ri< ci c1, after licensing with royalty, market price PR= 1+Âk 6=i ck+c1+riK+1 ,
since c1 < ri+ c1 < ci, we have PF < PR < P, then we only need PF > cK , i.e.
1+X +2c1 > (K+1)cK to guarantee that no firm exits the market after licens-
ing with fixed fee as well as licensing with royalty. Joint profit of licensor and















So when ri < ci  c1, licensing with fixed fee yields higher joint profit.
Now we compare consumer surplus of licensing with royalty and licensing
with fixed fee. We assume firm 1 licenses its technology to firm i in two types
of games.
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(1) If ri =
 (K+3)(1 Kc1+Âk 6=i ck)
2 2K2 2K , after licensing with royalty and licensing


































Since c1  c2  ... cK , we have ÂKk 6=1,i ck > (K 2)c1, so




ck+K+3  (K2+2K 3)c1 > 0
(2) If ri = ci  c1, as we have shown before, firms will choose their pre-
licensing output, so total output will be equal to the one before licensing. Also,
it is shown in Creane, Ko, Konishi (2013) that after licensing with fixed fee,
total output will be higher than before. Thus we have QR < QF . In these two







So we must have CSR <CSF , i.e. consumer surplus after licensing with royalty
is lower than the consumer surplus after licensing with fixed fee.
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Proof of Proposition 4.4
(1) If ri =
 (K+3)(1 Kc1+Âk 6=i ck)
2 2K2 2K , denote Âk 6=1,i ck = X , Âk 6=1,i c
2
k = Y , 2K
2 +
2K  2 = A, 4K4+ 8K3  4K2  8K+ 4 = B, 2K3+ 4K2  2 = C, K+ 1 = D,
K2+2K+1= E, we have
ABCDE(IPF   IPR)
= 4(K+3)(X+1)(K3+2K2 1)2(5K 3X+5KX+8K2X+2K3X 2K3+1)
For licensing with fixed fee, we have P= 1+Â
K
k=1 ck
K+1 , and we need P  cK for
the existence of interior solution (no firm stops producing after licensing), so we
have the following conclusion: If cK > 2+c1+ciK+1 , X   1.
When X > 1, IPF   IPR is positive, thus when no firm exits the market after
licensing with fixed fee or licensing with royalty, industry profit after licensing
with fixed fee exceeds industry profit after licensing with royalty.












industry profit after licensing with fixed fee can be written as:




IPF   IPR = (1 QF)QF   (1 QR)QR+Â
k 6=i
ck(qRk  qFk )+ c1(qRi  qFi )
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Denote ÂKk 6=i ck = Y , K2+2K+1= A, K+1= B we have






Thus, when c1 is small enough relative to ck,k 6= i, we have ÂKk 6=i(ck c1)>
K 1
K+3 . Thus IP
F > IPR, i.e, industry profit after licensing with fixed fee exceeds
the one after licensing with royalty. Otherwise industry profit is higher when we
licensing is based on royalty.
B. Proofs of Section 4.3.1
Proof of Proposition 4.5
Proof. Suppose firm 1 licenses its technology to firm i > E, denote royalty of
firm i as ri, we can work out the optimal royalty below:





K2+EK+3E+1 , we have t1 < t
⇤, thus there are two cases,
(1) When t1 < c < t⇤, ri = (K+3)(1+(E K)c
⇤+(K E 1)c)
2K2+2K 2 , (2) When c < t1 < t
⇤,
ri = c  c⇤. We first consider case (1).
(1) t1 < c< t⇤
In this case, ri =
(K+3)(1+(E K)c⇤+(K E 1)c)
2K2+2K 2 . We can work out firms’ opti-






2(K2+K 1) ,1 k  E
qRk =
c 2c⇤  Ec+Ec⇤+K(c⇤  3c 2Ec+2Ec⇤+2)+1




2EK+3K+E 1 , we have that t1 < t2 < t
⇤, also, qRk > 0,E <
k  K,k 6= i if t1 < c< t2 and qRk < 0,E < k  K,k 6= i if t2 < c< t⇤.
(i) t1 < c< t2
In this case, qRk > 0,E < k  K,k 6= i. So we have
PR = 1 QR = c+ c 2c
⇤  Ec+Ec⇤+K(c⇤  3c 2Ec+2Ec⇤+2)+1
2(K2+K 1)
we can see that PR > c, thus non-licensed firms will not exit the market after
licensing.
(ii) t2 < c< t⇤
In this case, qRk < 0,E < k  K,k 6= i. So non-licensed inefficient firms
exit the market after licensing, i.e. qRk = 0,E < k  K,k 6= i. Only firms with
marginal cost c⇤ and licensee remain in the market. We have
qRi =





In section 4.2, we have shown that after non-drastic licensing with royalty,
when K 6= 4, joint profit of licensor and licensee increases, if marginal costs of
some of the non-licensed inefficient firms keep increasing, joint profit of licensor
and licensee keeps increasing. If those non-licensed inefficient firms exit market
finally, it is equivalent to the scenario we are analyzing now. Thus we know that
after licensing with royalty, if non-licensed inefficient firms exit the market,
joint profit of licensor and licensee increases.
Before licensing, we have P> c> c⇤, after licensing, we have c⇤ < PR < c,
thus we must haveQR >Q, since consumer surplus equalsCS=Q2/2, we know
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that consumer surplus must increase after licensing.
Also, after licensing with royalty, if non-licensed inefficient firms exit the
market, since joint profit of licensor and licensee increases and non-licensed
efficient firms have profit loss, industry profit could increase or decrease.
Now we analyze the change of social welfare. Before and after licensing,
































where Q = Q1+Q2. Since c⇤ < c, P(Q) > c⇤, we must have SWR > SW , i.e.
social welfare increases after licensing.
(2) c< t1.
In this case, ri = c  c⇤ and each firm chooses its pre-licensing output level.
Thus market price PR = P, according to equation (4.5), non-licensed inefficient
firms won’t exit the market after licensing.
Proof of Proposition 4.6
Proof. Total output after licensing isQR= qR1+q
R
i +(K 2)qRj = 1  K(3c
⇤ 5c+2) c⇤+1
2K2+2K 2  
c, market price PR = 1 QR = K(3c⇤ 5c+2) c⇤+12K2+2K 2 + c. Since non-licensed firms
exit the market after licensing, we have c⇤ < PR < c, from which we have
c⇤ < 5Kc 2K 13K 1 .
If only firm 1 and firm i remain in the market after licensing, optimal outputs
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thus firm i will also exit the market, with only firm 1 remaining in the market
and qR1 =
1 c⇤
2 . So firm 1’s profit as well as industry profit decrease a lot after












Then since consumer surplus isCS=Q2/2, consumer surplus is decreased after
licensing, also, social welfare is decreased after licensing.
C. Proofs of Section 4.3.2
Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof. To make sure K firms produce in the market before licensing, we need
P> c> c⇤, which yields
(E+1)c Ec⇤ < 1. (E.1)
Suppose firm 1 licenses its technology to firm i > E, then firm i’s marginal
cost becomes c⇤ and we have E+ 1 firms with marginal cost c⇤ and K E  1
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firms with marginal cost c, we can work out the optimal outputs of firms, total






















K  (E+1)c⇤   (K E 1)c
K+1
P = 1 Q= 1+(E+1)c
⇤+(K E 1)c
K+1
If after licensing, firms with marginal cost c exit the market, we must have












Proof of Proposition 4.7
Proof. We know that joint profit after licensing doesn’t depend on c, but joint





























Thus ∂pJ/∂c is increasing in c. According to (E.3), the lower bound of c is
c= 1+(E+1)c
⇤












When c⇤ approaches zero, the equation above will be positive, when c⇤ ap-
















E ), we must have
∂pJ
∂c > 0, so pJ is
increasing in c, pFJ  pJ is decreasing in c. Plugging the upper bound of c into





+ 8KE(c⇤)2 4KEc⇤  4KE+8K(c⇤)2 4Kc⇤  4K+E2c⇤  E2+2E(c⇤)2
  2E+2(c⇤)2 2
184
in which A= (K+1)2(E+2)2(2K+E+K2E+K2+2KE+1). For any c⇤< 1,
the equation above is positive. Thus when c approaches its upper bound, joint




E ), joint profit
must increase after licensing.
Now we compare consumer surplus before and after licensing. We derive
















(K+1)(E+2)(QF  Q) = (E+2)c  (E+1)c⇤  1
From (E.3) we know that the above equation is positive, so we have QF > Q,
total output increases after licensing, thus consumer surplus increases after li-
censing.
Now we compare the industry profit before and after licensing. From the





























Denote K2+2K+1= A, E2+4E+4= B, we have
AB(IPF   IP) = BE2(2K E)(cc⇤  2c⇤+1) 2BE2(c+ c⇤)+BE3c(c  c⇤)
+ (A+AE BK)(1  c)2+BE(c+ c⇤)(c  c⇤)(2E+KE+1)
  2BE(K E+ c  c⇤)
From the equation above, we can see that industry profit after licensing could
increase or decrease, it depends on the number of firms as well as marginal costs
of firms.
From the function of IP and IPF , we can see that industry profit after li-
censing doesn’t depend on c, but industry profit before licensing depends on c.






The function above is increasing in c. According to equation (E.3), the lower
bound of c is 1+(E+1)c
⇤














E ), we must have
∂ IP
∂c > 0, so IP is
increasing in c, IPF   IP is decreasing in c.
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Proof of Proposition 4.8
Proof. To make sure K firms produce in the market before licensing, we need
P> c> c⇤ which yields
2c  c⇤ < 1. (E.4)
Suppose firm 1 licenses its technology to firm i 6= 1, then firm i0s marginal cost
becomes c⇤, we can work out the optimal output of each firm:






,k 6= 1, i








If firms other than firm 1 and firm i exit the market after licensing, we must have













After licensing, change of firm 1’s profit is






































Denote K2+2K+1= A, we have
9ADp1 = 2A(c⇤)2 9 9c2 4Ac⇤+18c 18Kc+18Kc⇤+18Kc2
  9K2c2 9K2(c⇤)2 18Kcc⇤+18K2cc⇤+2A
in which 2A(c⇤)2 4Ac⇤< 0, 9 9c2+18c< 0, 18Kc+18Kc⇤< 0, 18Kc2 
9K2c2  9K2(c⇤)2+ 18K2cc⇤+ 2A =  9K2(c  c⇤)2+ 18Kc2+ 2A <  9K2+
18Kc2+ 2A < 0,  18Kcc⇤ < 0. Thus we have 9ADp1 < 0, firm 1 has a loss
after licensing. All other firms have lost Dpk = (1 2c+c
⇤
K+1 )
2 after licensing. We
















3(K+1)(Q QF) = K(1+2c⇤  3c)  (c⇤  3c+1) 1





From (E.6) we know that the equation above is negative, thus Q QF is de-
creasing in K. Also, when K = 3, we have 3(3+ 1)(Q QF) = 5c⇤   6c+ 1,
then from (E.6), we have







So for any K   3, we have Q < QF . Thus we have CSF increases after licens-
ing. From the profits of firms before and after licensing, we can derive the
corresponding industry profit:










IPF   IP= pF1 +pFi  p1  (K 1)pk = Dp1  (K 1)pk < 0
thus industry profit after licensing decreases.














Thus we can derive change of social welfare below:







































































Denote K2+2K+1= A, we have
18ADW =  9K2[(c  c⇤)2+ c2] 36(c  c⇤)+9(5c  c⇤)(c  c⇤)
+ 8A[8(c⇤)2+(c⇤  1)2]+18K(c+ c⇤)+18Kc(K  c)+18Kc⇤(c  c⇤)
We can see that the first term is negative and the rests are positive. Also,
for any K   3, 18K(c+c⇤) 36(c c⇤)> 0, 8A[8(c⇤)2+(c⇤ 1)2] 9K2[(c 
c⇤)2+c2]> 0, So we have DW > 0, i.e. after licensing, social welfare increases.
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